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Abstract 
 
The current thesis examines the role of intuition in the strategic decision making process 
of executives. Limited applied research has been conducted on the field of intuitive 
processes in strategic decision making of top managers, therefore this paper attempts to 
shed more light on this specific topic.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate how and to what extent intuition affects 
executives in the process of strategic decision making. Furthermore, it aims to 
investigate under which conditions it is more probable for an executive to utilize 
intuition in the strategic decision making process. 
In order to accomplish the aforementioned purpose, the authors conducted a series of 
qualitative personal interviews with five executives, structuring them on the basis of 
the three strategic decision making dimensions; intuition, rationality and political 
behaviour. The research was conducted with an abductive approach, since the 
researchers had to move back and forth, between data and theory, combining deduction 
and induction in a sense. 
The collected data were analyzed through the moderating lenses of three decision-
specific characteristics and three company characteristics. Following a thorough and 
extensive analysis of the data, the research supports that intuition has a prominent role 
in the managerial strategic decision making, being present in all the executives who 
were interviewed, regardless of their position in the rationality-intuition spectrum. The 
study indicates that in multiple situations, for instance when information was scarce, 
the environment was volatile, the situation was highly complex, or an immediate 
decision was of the essence, managers employed intuitive processes when making 
crucial decisions that affected the future of their organization. 
Moreover, the study concluded that managers favoured intuition in strategic decision 
making in cases of high decision uncertainty and unstable environments, verifying 
already existing theories on the field. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
This study investigates the strategic decision making process of executives. According 
to Buchanan and O’Connell (2006) decision making is an old and broad concept that 
finds its roots back in a time where men looked for guidance in the stars. Since then, 
the human kind has tried to invent new tools that would enable it to make better 
decisions: in the fifth century BC, the citizens of Athens invented an archaic form of 
democracy that helped them to make decisions by voting; since the ninth century the 
Hindu-Arabic numerical system started to circulate and stimulated the growth of 
mathematics and algebra; in 1900 Sigmund Freud proposes the idea that actions are 
usually influenced by causes hidden in the unconscious; the second half of the 20th 
century saw the beginning of the development of decision support tools based on 
computer technologies (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). The growing refinement of risk 
management tools, together with a better understanding of human behaviours and 
cognitive processes, and the advancement in technology, has contributed to improve 
the decision making both for individuals and organizations (Buchanan & O’Connell, 
2006). Decision making has been, therefore, studied by many disciplines: important 
research has been conducted in fields such as sociology, psychology, political sciences, 
mathematics and economics. As a result, there is a wide selection of literature available 
on strategic decision making. 
In the business world, the term decision making was utilized for the first time by 
Chester Barnard in his book “The functions of the Executive” (1938). Until then it was 
confined mainly in the public administration’s language (Buchanan & O’Connell, 
2006). Barnard, together with later authors such as James March, Henry Mintzberg and 
Herbert Simon, started the study of decision making from a managerial perspective 
(Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). After that, for many years the studies have focused on 
the way decisions should be made and a big part of this research was focused on finding 
new techniques in order to improve the rationality of the decision maker (March, 1991). 
Another part of the research, instead, valued more the way decisions were actually made 
in organizations (March, 1991), focusing mainly on the processes aspect (Simon, 1987). 
More recent studies on strategic decision making can be divided in two types of 
research: the “content research”, which is focused mainly on specific decisions as for 
instance mergers and acquisitions; and the “process research”, which is instead focused 
on the way managers reach a strategic decision (Elbanna & Child, 2007). According to 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) these two categories are related and can influence each 
other.  
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One of the big questions that many researchers and experts are trying to answer is why 
some companies become successful and some others fail (Wang, Hedman & 
Tuunainen, 2016). The example of Nokia is emblematic for how important strategic 
decisions are for an organization. According to Wang, Hedman and Tuunainen (2016) 
in the last ten years Nokia seems to have done everything in the right way, being market 
leader for a long time, but also very careful in analyzing customer needs and investing 
huge amounts of money in research and development, as well as in marketing. It 
acquired companies with new technology perspectives, and cooperated with 
universities and research institutes. Wang, Hedman and Tuunainen (2016) analyzed the 
failure of Nokia identifying a series of critical strategic decisions that affected the 
company until its recent debacle: the decision to focus mainly on mobile phones in the 
1990s, but also the choice of Symbian as the only operative system, the partnership 
with Microsoft and finally the selection of Stephen Elop as CEO. On the other hand, 
Apple in the last decade transformed from a company that based its success only on a 
niche market of designers and printing companies to one of the most successful 
companies in the world, able to create also a whole new market with the development 
of the smartphone (Riedel, 2014). According to Morrish (2012), an important role for 
the success of Apple can be attributed to the intuitive skills of the former CEO Steve 
Jobs, which had almost a mystical view about it and based most of his career on that.  
According to Carmeli and Tishler (2006) the role of top executives and their managerial 
skills highly affect the performance of the organization. Executives are at the top of the 
organizational structure and make strategic decision that affect the whole company 
through descending levels (Harrison, 1996). Carmeli and Tishler (2006) state that the 
impact of top executives on the organization is even bigger than other factors such as 
the specific industry sectors, the size of the company, as well as the environmental 
uncertainty. Khatri and Ng (2000) finally describe how intuition is a crucial element for 
executives in the strategic decision making process.  
Even though the role of intuition has been studied from a scientific and philosophical 
perspective since the 17th century, it is only in the past 30 years that it became an 
important scientific subject for psychology, economics and the management field 
(Morrish, 2012). The role of intuition in the management area, however, has been 
considered for several years as a minor phenomenon, compared to the rationality field 
(Calabretta, Gemser & Wijnberg, 2017). Researchers preferred to focus more on the 
rationality aspect of the strategic decision making, however in the last decades a new 
tendency to explore the role of intuition on a deeper level can be observed in the 
management field (Khatri & Ng, 2000; Elbanna, 2006; Calabretta, Gemser & Wijnberg, 
2017). 
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1.2 Problem Discussion 
 
Elbanna and Child (2007) identify three key strategic decision making process 
dimensions; rationality, political behaviour and intuition. For many years the research 
on strategic decision making focused mainly on the rational aspect of the process 
(Calabretta, Gemser & Wijnberg, 2017). According to Mintzberg and Westley this 
process approach can be described as purely logic and step-by-step: “define, diagnose, 
design, decide” (2001, p.89). The assumption that this rational process allows better 
decisions than those coming from intuitive processes has been, however, questioned by 
many authors (Khatri & Ng, 2000). March (1991) observes that the research discovered 
several limits to rationality in decision-making. Simon (1987) states the effective 
manager needs to analyze problems systematically and at the same time needs to 
respond to situations rapidly according to intuition and personal judgement. Mintzberg 
and Westley (2001) support that organizations, to be effective, should embrace not just 
a rational approach but also intuitive or action-oriented forms of decision making. 
Hence, the state of the research suggest that for a successful strategic decision making 
both rationality and intuition are required (Calabretta, Gemser & Wijnberg, 2017).  
Unlike the rational perspective, not much applied research has been conducted on the 
field of intuitive processes in the strategic decision literature (Elbanna, 2006). 
According to Elbanna (2006), most of the serious academic work on the topic is 
theoretical and held by psychologists, while empirical research in an applied 
management environment is rare (Agor, 1989). The concept of intuition is “unrefined 
and poorly understood” (Clarke & Mackaness, 2001, p.148), while Miller and Ireland 
claim that “intuition presents itself as a troubling tool” (2005, p. 29). Consequently, the 
role of intuition in strategic decision making and the way it affects the formulation of 
decisions for the management executives is a field that needs to be further examined. 
In the last decade there has been an increasing interest in the study of the role of 
intuition in the strategic decision making process, especially in organizations (Elbanna 
& Fadol, 2016). However, the research is still lacking of relevant empirical data and 
consistent methods (Papadakis, Thanos and Barwise, 2010). Elbanna and Fadol clearly 
state “more research of an empirical kind is required to better understand the role of the 
noteworthy and under-studied phenomenon of intuition in the Strategic Decision 
Making Process” (2016, p.657). Elbanna, Child and Dayan (2013) argue that to better 
understand the use of intuition in strategic decision making more research is needed, 
especially when considering the relation with other variables, such as the characteristics 
of the decision itself, but also the characteristics of the company and the external 
environment. Moreover, the majority of empirical studies on intuitive processes do not 
investigate the relationship between intuition and organizational outcomes (Elbanna & 
Child, 2007). Therefore, a gap was identified in the existing empirical research on the 
role of intuition in strategic decision making. 
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1.3 Purpose and Research Questions 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how and to what extent intuition affects 
executives in the process of strategic decision making. The current paper adopts the 
view of Carmeli and Tishler (2006), that the role of top executives and their managerial 
skills highly affect the performances of the organization, thus we focused on top 
executives and their strategic decision making processes.  
According to the previous arguments, this study aims to explore the following main 
research questions: 
 What is the role of intuition in a strategic decision making context? 
Furthermore, in order to acquire a better understanding on the topic, an additional sub-
question was addressed:  
 Under which conditions is it more probable for an executive to utilize intuition 
in the strategic decision making process? 
We attempted to contribute to the increasing academic awareness in the role of intuition 
in the past years, and explore its position in the contemporary managerial context. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
This chapter aims to present a thorough summary of the extensive literature on the 
strategic decision making field and to provide a theoretical framework in order to 
answer our research questions. We start by providing definitions in order to narrow 
down the broad field of strategic decision making. This will help us to conduct a more 
focused research on strategic decision making by targeting managerial decisions, and 
specifically the strategic decisions made in organizations by executives.  
 
2.1 Definition of Strategic Decision Making 
 
The literature provides a broad range of definitions concerning decision making. The 
research can focus either on the decision itself or the process that leads to a decision 
(Harrison, 1996). Simon (1960) for instance, states “I shall be referring not merely to 
the final act of choice among alternatives, but rather to the whole process of decision” 
(p.1). Harrison instead defined the concept of decision as “a moment in an ongoing 
process of evaluating alternatives for meeting an objective” (1996, p.46). In addition to 
this, Ofstad (1961) described management decision as “a judgement regarding what 
one ought to do in a certain situation after having deliberated on some alternative 
courses of actions” (1961, p.5). Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theoret (1976) describe a 
decision as “a specific commitment to action (usually a commitment of resources) and 
a decision process as “a set of actions and dynamic factors that begins with the 
identification of a stimulus for action and ends with the specific commitment to action” 
(p. 246). 
A strategic decision can be defined in many ways. Mador (2000) notes that this kind of 
decisions are characterized by complexity and a high level of uncertainty. Eisenhardt 
and Zbaracki (1992) describe them as “infrequent decisions made by the top leaders of 
an organization that critically affect organizational health and survival” (p. 17). On the 
same line is Harrison (1996), for whom strategic decisions are those made by top 
managers and able to “set the tone and tempo of managerial decision making for every 
individual and unit throughout the entire organization” (p. 46). Hickson et al. (1986) 
add that a decision may be considered strategic in one industry but the same decision 
may very well be considered less strategic or not strategic in a different one. For 
instance, a strategic decision could be the launch of a new product such as a new car in 
the automotive industry. However, the launch of a new product such as a new toy in a 
factory that produces hundreds of toys every year might not be strategic (Elbanna, 
2006). 
Regarding the characteristics of a strategic decision, Elbanna (2006) distinguishes four 
different attributes: the association with high risks and uncertainties, the interrelations 
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with other decisions in the organization, the fact that they do not have one best solution 
among the others and it is hard to reverse the decision once it has been made. Shirley 
(1982), instead, provides a set of five distinctive criteria in order to identify these 
decisions: (1) the decision needs to define the relationship between the organization 
and its environment, (2) the decision must be affecting the whole organization, (3) the 
decision has to be based on inputs from different organizational areas, (4) the decision 
must provide constraints and directions for all the administrative and operational 
activities of the organization, (5) the decision needs to be salient for the long term 
success of the organization. Mador, after an extensive literature review and empirical 
studies on decision making, identified a few common characteristics to recognize good 
strategic decisions: comprehensiveness, extensiveness and speed (2000, p.217). 
From the previous considerations it is possible to understand the importance that such 
decisions have for an organization. They give origin to several other decisions of lesser 
magnitude through all the descending management levels of the company (Harrison, 
1996). On this point, Harrison (1996) specify that a wrong decision taken at the top of 
the organization is likely to have the same negative effect on the lower levels of 
management. Therefore, strategic decisions are responsible for the future outcomes of 
the organization seen in its entirety and, most of all, for its survival (Harrison, 1996).  
  
2.2 The Strategic Decision Making Process  
 
According to Harrison (1996) decision making is the principal activity that differentiate 
the role of the manager from other occupations in the society. On the same line is 
Drucker (1967) that states “to make the important decision is the specific executive 
task” (p. 98). The significance of decision making for an organization is highlighted by 
Cornell (1980), who states that “of all the managerial functions that executives perform, 
the act of making a decision is without equal in importance” (p. 13). Similarly, 
McLaughlin (1995) claims that organizations reach success when they outperform their 
competitors in at least three different ways: by making better decisions, by deciding 
faster and by implementing more decisions.  
The studies on decision making processes started to take place in the business world 
when Chester Barnard placed it at the center of the executive’s functions (Barnard, 
1938). Since then the research on decision making went through different approaches. 
For many years in the last century, decisions have been seen and studied as phenomena 
driven exclusively by a rational mind (Langley et al. 1995), even though bounded 
(Simon, 1979). According to Langley et al. (1995) this approach to the study of decision 
making has produced a credible description of the phenomenon, but it has failed in 
giving an explanation of its most significant aspects. In order to give a better 
explanation about strategic decision making, the research started to take into account 
also other elements in relation with rationality, such as intuitive processes and political 
models (Khatri & Ng, 2000; Langley et al. 1995; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). 
7 
 
Therefore, rationality and intuition are now accepted as both valuable for strategic 
decision making (Calabretta, Gemser & Wijnberg, 2017). 
The literature in decision making processes divides the decision making models in 
structured, and unstructured or less structured models. When they are structured, 
authors talk about a rational approach, where each phase can be distinguished and 
individually defined, in order to help decision makers to make better decisions 
(Drucker, 1967; Harrison, 1996; Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theoret 1976). 
Unstructured or less structured models are, instead, the ones taking into account other 
elements, such as a political behaviour view, according to which the strategic decision 
is formed in a process in which decision makers, having different interests, try to 
influence others opinion to achieve their goals (Elbanna, 2006). Another unstructured 
approach sees the strategic decision as the outcome of an intuitive process, focused 
more on the emotions and the senses of the managers, rather than structured models 
(Gigerenzer, 2001; Simon, 1993).  
An example of a structured model is, for instance, the one described by Harrison (1996), 
in which he distinguishes six functions: (1) setting managerial objectives, (2) searching 
for alternatives, (3) comparing and evaluating alternatives, (4) the act of choice, (5) 
implementing the decision, (6) follow-up and control. The process starts with setting 
the objectives, therefore a scanning of the internal and external environment of the 
organization helps to gather information in order to set different alternatives. At this 
point the alternatives are compared and evaluated, and only after this point the decision 
maker makes his choice. The decision now needs to be transformed in an operational 
reality by implementing it. The last phase concerns the coincidence of the initial 
objective and the actual outcome (Harrison, 1996).  
Another model is described by Corner, Kinicki, & Keats (1994). The authors in this 
case studied the interaction between the organizational and individual levels in the 
strategic decision making process. The first stage is the “attention”. The top managers 
focus their attention on a specific information about a strategic decision before 
processing it. The second stage is the “encoding”, which means to interpret the 
information. This phase is usually characterized by biased decisions because of the 
inclusion of previous existing knowledge. The third stage is the “storage” or “retrieval”, 
which means the preservation of the information previously interpreted. In this case the 
link between the individual and the organizational level is the socialization. This can 
be seen when senior top executives influence newcomers with routines and already 
accepted knowledge. The next stage is the “decision”. According to Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani & Theoret (1976) the decisions on a strategical level come from the 
information that was previously stored. After the decision comes the stage of “action”. 
This is the enactment of the strategic decision. On the individual level this is the action 
of the executive within the personal sphere of responsibility. On the organizational level 
it is the coordinated action of the different people involved in the process to implement 
a strategic decision. Finally, the “outcomes” are the results of the implementation of 
the decision, and can be either on an individual level, as for example in terms of 
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personal evaluation, either on the organizational level in terms of financial returns 
(Corner, Kinicki, & Keats, 1994). 
 
2.3 Strategic Decision Making Dimensions 
 
Elbanna and Child (2007) identify three strategic decision making process dimensions: 
rationality, political behaviour and intuition, which are thoroughly examined below. 
 
2.3.1 Rationality 
 
Rationality in decision making is part of the broader discussion about economic 
rationality (Langley et al. 1995). According to Elbanna (2006), the level of rationality 
in strategic decision making has played an important role as one of its main elements, 
and it has been intensively investigated by many researchers.   
There are several definitions of rationality depending on the specific field in which the 
research puts its focus. In the economic perspective, rationality often refers to the 
maximization of utility; in this view the assumption is that individuals tend to maximize 
their expected utility (Elbanna & Child, 2007). The theory of expected utility was 
formulated for the first time by Neumann and Morgenstern (1953 cited in Fox, 2015). 
Right after its formulation other authors began to apply this model of rational behaviour 
as the explanation of how people make decisions (Fox, 2015).  
Simon was one of the first researchers to challenge this notion in the 1950’s. According 
to Simon (1978 cited in Langley et al., 1995), decision makers are not omniscient, and 
their rationality is limited by their own capabilities. Simon’s view remained confined, 
however, in what was lately defined as the “cerebral rationality” (Langley et al. 1995, 
p.262). Simon kept seeing the decision making as a cognitive process that could be 
easily explained by a step to step succession (Langley et al. 1995). On the same line as 
Simon we find several authors. Butler (2002) gives a definition indicating that 
“Rationality is the reason for doing something and to judge a behaviour as reasonable 
is to be able to say that the behaviour is understandable within a given frame of 
reference” (p. 226). Alternatively, Dean and Sharfman (1993) claim rationality 
represents the type of behaviour that is logical in pursuing goals. Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki (1992) state that rationality follows the assumption that “human behaviour 
has some purpose” (p. 18) and this usually is expressed in a model of rational action.  
The theory of bounded rationality was proposed for the first time in the 1950’s as an 
alternative to the classical concept of rationality (Langley et al. 1995). Snyman and 
Drew (2003) point out that bounded rationality centers on the decision making process 
which is limited by cognitive and political realities. Because of these restrictions, 
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decision makers attempt to reach goals which are sufficient rather than optimal 
(Eisenhardt, 1997). Claims from Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) support that empirical 
research has proven decision makers are more boundedly rational than purely rational. 
They refer to the cognitive limits of the rational decision making model, the complexity 
of problems and the conflicts between decision makers which form the decision 
process.  
There are three main obstacles in adopting a rational decision making process, as 
identified by Jones, Jacobs and Spijker (1992). First of all, the organization may lack 
the necessary recourses to find and examine the respective information, secondly, the 
cognitive abilities of decision makers could be limited and, thirdly, managers could be 
reluctant to stir the political structure of the organization (Jones, Jacobs & Spijker, 
1992). 
Rational processes have been a central part of strategic decision making and a great 
amount of theoretical and empirical research has been conducted on the topic (Elbanna 
& Child, 2007). The interplay between rational decision processes and organizational 
outcomes has divided the scholars in the field and no consensus has been reached (Goll 
& Rasheed, 1997). Elbanna (2006) mentions that there is empirical evidence for all 
kinds of possible relationships between the rationality and organizational outcomes; 
positive relationship, negative relationship, or no relationship whatsoever. For instance, 
Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984) identified a negative relationship between rationality 
and performance in an unstable environment, whereas a positive relationship was 
proven in a stable environment (Fredrickson, 1984). In contrast to the findings of 
Fredrickson and his colleagues, Dean and Sharfman (1996) found a stronger 
relationship between rationality and decision effectiveness in unstable environments, 
rather than in stable ones. Furthermore, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) concluded 
that a positive relationship between rationality and firm performance exists in a high-
velocity environment.  
 
2.3.2 Political behaviour  
 
The political perspective on strategic decision making originates from the political 
science literature of 1950s, when a number of scholars supported the idea that the 
conflicting goals and interests of individuals affect decision making (Eisenhardt & 
Zbaracki, 1992). Political behaviour among the different counterparts has been 
recognised as a characteristic of decision making and has received considerable 
attention from scholars (Elbanna & Child, 2007). According to this perspective, 
decisions are the outcome of a process where decision makers have contrasting goals, 
create partnerships to achieve them and the opinion of the most powerful prevails 
(Elbanna, 2006). The political approach opposes to the rational approach (Eisenhardt, 
1997). While in the rational perspective the decision is made without any form of 
personal judgement or bias, the political view, instead, considers the fact that decisions 
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are made by a group of people with their conflicting preferences (Elbanna, 2006). Even 
though they may have a shared objective, a conflict is created due to the personal 
interests and expectations each executive has (Elbanna, 2006). 
There are two main points of view from which experts describe political behaviour in 
strategic decision making. On the one hand, we find the ones who focus on investigating 
politics inside organizations, either between different members or different 
organizational units (Elbanna, 2006). On the other hand, some researchers (for example, 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theoret, 1976) utilize a broader approach to include 
influences on decision making from both internal (organizational members and/or 
units) and external factors, like for example, public agencies and customers (Elbanna, 
2006). The common point of these two perspectives, as Elbanna (2006) claims, is that 
people, either inside or outside the organization, believe the decision outcomes can have 
an immediate effect on them, thus trying to indulge their personal or organizational 
needs by influencing the decision making process.  
The role of political behaviour in strategic decision making processes and its effect on 
organizational outcomes has been examined by various researchers. The majority of 
them, for example Dean and Sharfman (1996) or Gandz and Murray (1980), have 
identified a negative relationship between political behaviour and organizational 
outcomes. One of the factors which justify this statement is that political strategies are 
opposite to the direct spirit of open discussions and sharing information between the 
counterparts (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). According to Elbanna (2006), political 
behaviour can lead to a deterioration in the quality of information and limit the 
information flow, thus managers can decide based on insufficient information, resulting 
in poor performance. Moreover, political processes are dividing and time-consuming, 
postponing the decision, which may lead to a loss of opportunities and profits (Pfeffer, 
1992), a phenomenon more evident in competitive and volatile environments, where 
fast decisions are of the essence (Eisenhardt, 1989). Lastly, political behaviour can 
result in incomplete understanding of environmental restrictions, thus weakening the 
strategic decision effectiveness, since political tactics turn to the interior of the 
organization, rather than identifying attainable solutions in the given environment or 
including alternatives, that could collide with individual interests (Dean & Sharfman, 
1996). 
 
2.3.3 Intuition 
 
Intuition is commonly conceived as a decision making mechanism that relies on rapid, 
non-conscious recognition of patterns and associations to generate affectively charged 
judgments (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Simon (1987) explains intuition by putting it in 
relation with experience. According to the author managers with years of experience 
possess an amount of knowledge that make them find solutions to problems without 
being able to show how they achieved the result. Intuition differs from rational decision 
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making in that it is rapid and the decision maker cannot provide a linear, logical 
reasoning of the process, that can be thoroughly reconstructed and explained in 
retrospective (Simon, 1987). According to Khatri and Ng (2000) it is not the opposite 
of rationality and not even a guessing process, but it is rather a reasoning process that 
the manager has developed through years of experience in problem solving. Khatri and 
Ng describe intuition as “a holistic perception that transcends rational ways of 
knowing” (2000, p. 60). There are important characteristics about intuition. First of all, 
intuition is subconscious. On this point, Khatri and Ng (2000) state that people have 
countless experiences stored like a reserve in the subconscious, and it is thanks to 
intuition that people can draw and choose among the alternatives the one that is more 
fitted. This process is made by the mind in an unconscious way (Khatri & Ng, 2000). 
Intuition is also complex, according to Khatri and Ng (2000), while the rational 
analytical models are based on the assumption of linearity, which is a limit. On the 
contrary, intuition allows more complex models not being confined by the bounds of 
rationality (Khatri & Ng, 2000). Another characteristic of intuition is that the process 
is very quick. Khatri and Ng (2000) describe how intuition can allow managers to know 
practically immediately what is the best solution or course of action. They claim that 
one of the most important characteristics is that intuition is not emotion. According to 
Khatri and Ng (2000) feelings such as anxiety, fear, desire, are most likely able to 
interfere with the intuition process, not allowing the manager to clearly be receptive to 
unconscious solutions and messages. Khatri and Ng (2000) suggest that intuition does 
not concern a biased process, but it can be affected by biases as much as a rational 
process. Finally, the last characteristic that Khatri and Ng (2000) analyse is the fact that 
intuition is part of all decisions. Even in the rational analytical tools that are generally 
used, there is a level of unknown that cannot be measured, and this is when intuition is 
used for instance to interpret data (Khatri & Ng, 2000). 
Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004) argue that intuition can be difficult to describe but is 
easily recognisable. Intuition is linked to having a hunch or a strong feeling of knowing 
what will happen (Vaughan, 1989), without being able to explain the logic behind it 
(Nutt, 1998). Parikh (1994) claims intuition might be another form of intelligence, 
which decision makers are able to utilize when rational tools are not available. Sadler-
Smith and Shefy state that intuition can be viewed as “a composite phenomenon 
involving interplay between knowing (intuition-as-expertise) and sensing (intuition-as-
feeling)” (2004, p. 76). Khatri and Ng (2000) identified three operational indicators of 
intuition, which are presented below: 
 
1. Reliance on judgment 
Decision makers utilize intuition when a quick decision is needed, information is 
insufficient and there is no prior example. In cases such as these, judgement is vital. 
Butler (2002) claims judgement is a key factor in the process of creating a solution. 
Daft and Lengel (1986) propose that if the work process cannot be analysed, executives 
must employ judgement instead of computational procedures.   
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2. Reliance on experience 
Intuition constitutes a type of experience, based on a deep knowledge of problems, 
connected to a specific profession or environment (Prietula & Simon, 1989). Wally and 
Baum (1994) describe intuition as an ability which can be learned from experience.  
3. Use of “gut feeling” 
Intuition is characterized as a process of feeling a problem or trusting a person’s gut 
feeling (Parikh, 1994). In the case that executives make a wrong decision, they will not 
be in a position to defend it, since there is no obvious reason on which it was based 
(Schoemaker & Russo, 1993).   
 
2.4 The Interrelation Between Rationality, Political 
Behaviour and Intuition 
 
According to Mintzberg and Westley (2001), companies, to be effective, should 
embrace both rational analytical tools or models and intuitive or action-oriented forms 
of decision making. Mintzberg and Westley (2001) describe three main approaches to 
decision making, which are: “thinking first”, “seeing first” and “doing first”. According 
to the authors the “thinking first” model, which is the classical rational approach 
(define, diagnose, design, decide) has its limits because most of a decision lays not just 
in conscious thinking, but also in the unconscious. Therefore, according to Mintzberg 
and Westley (2001), this rational approach needs to be supplemented by two other 
approaches. According to the “seeing first” model, decisions are driven by what 
managers see or think. The last approach identified by the two authors is the “doing 
first” model, and it occurs when managers are required to make decisions without 
seeing or thinking, in other words when the need to take action is imminent. This theory 
can be summarized by three steps: enactment, selection and retention. The meaning of 
this can be found in the fact that when people are stuck, there is space for experimenting, 
learning by doing, and therefore collection of experience (Mintzberg & Westley, 2001). 
As a summary Mintzberg and Westley (2001) believe that the rational step by step logic 
is not enough for companies who want to be effective, there is also a need to incorporate 
a more intuitive or action oriented decision making process. 
According to Calabretta, Gemser and Wijnberg (2017), rationality and intuition are both 
valuable for strategic decision making, but at the same time they are two different 
concepts. When these two concepts are utilized together inevitably will create a tension 
and contradiction between each other (Calabretta, Gemser & Wijnberg, 2017). As 
Calabretta, Gemser and Wijnberg (2017) claim, the fact that intuitive and rational 
decision making are at the same time different concepts and both necessary for effective 
strategic decision making create a paradox. This is a new approach that tends to analyze 
the phenomena of decision making by considering the concept of intuition and 
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rationality as a whole, putting the focus on the tension rather than putting emphasis only 
on one of the two elements (Calabretta, Gemser & Wijnberg, 2017). 
The relation between political behaviours and intuition is addressed by Elbanna, Di 
Benedetto and Gherib (2015). According to the authors, political behaviors in the 
context of strategic decision making can increase decision intuition. The first 
consideration made is that in the political approach informal discussions are used to 
address strategic problems ending up in a low exchange of knowledge and information 
between the executive group members. Therefore intuitive decision making becomes 
more likely (Elbanna, Di Benedetto & Gherib, 2015). The second consideration 
concerns the fact that managers’ intuition approach tends to increase together with the 
intensifying of political activities in the strategic decision making process (Elbanna, Di 
Benedetto & Gherib, 2015). The authors state that political behaviours may be an 
indicator of an intuitive approach of the executives in their strategic decision making 
process. According to Elbanna, Di Benedetto and Gherib (2015) it is, therefore, likely 
that political behaviours have direct implications on intuition. 
 
2.5 The Role of Intuition in the Managerial Context 
 
One of the main assumption in decision making is that rational processes lead to better 
results than intuitive processes (Elbanna, 2006). This assumption has been criticized by 
various scholars (Khatri, 1994), for instance, Miller and Ireland (2005) indicate that 
many managers employ intuition as an effective technique for strategic decision 
making. In volatile conditions, strategy methods have to be flexible and resourceful 
(Grant, 2003).  
As Elbanna (2006) claims, the use of intuition in the modern business world is gaining 
popularity, since only a few strategic decisions have access to sufficient, precise and 
timely information. Burke and Miller (1999) suggest that managers find a number of 
advantages in the use of intuition in decision making, which are to speed up decision 
making, ameliorate ultimate decisions, accommodate personal development and 
promote decisions which are in accordance with the company. Burke and Miller (1999) 
argue that intuition can be favorable in certain occasions, and even the best available 
alternative. Intuitive processes can deal with more complexity than our conscious minds 
(Parikh, 1994).  
A number of researchers have suggested top managers utilize intuition in an unstable 
environment, for example Mintzberg (1994) and Quinn (1980), but few studies examine 
the relation between intuition and organizational outcomes (Elbanna, 2006). In one of 
the few papers which deal with this topic, Khatri and Ng (2000) found a positive 
relationship between intuition and organizational performance in an unstable 
environment, but a negative in a stable one.  
14 
 
However, the use of intuition in decision making has been also criticized. Sauter (1999) 
states that managers who employ intuition may become impatient with routines or 
details, reach a decision too fast, disregard important information, or follow a hunch 
when they should not.   
  
2.6 Strategic Decision-Specific Characteristics 
 
Rajagopalan, Rasheed and Datta (1993) argue that the link between the different 
decision characteristics and their performance implications is still uninvestigated. 
Elbanna and Child (2007) identify three decision-specific characteristics, namely 
decision importance, decision uncertainty and decision motive.  
Decision importance 
As Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers (1998) state, the perceived importance of a 
strategic decision is among the strongest characteristics of decision making behaviour. 
Since not all strategic decisions have the same level of importance, decision makers can 
approach them in different ways, for example executives are expected to utilize more 
rational processes for the most important decisions (Elbanna & Child, 2007). 
Executives are more prone to rationality when making crucial decisions for achieving 
the goals of the organization (Hickson et al. 1986).  
Decision uncertainty 
As Butler (2002) argues, decision uncertainty forms the essence of decision making. 
Elbanna and Child (2007) point out that various authors have approached uncertainty 
as a mystery which cannot be dealt with rational processes. For instance, Daft and 
Lengel (1986) state high decision uncertainty may result to more intuitive processes, 
meaning employing judgement and experience rather than computational techniques. 
Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers (1998) identify a positive association between 
decision uncertainty and politicization. They state that in cases when uncertainty is 
linked to the action needed to be taken or the collection of information, it is possible to 
anticipate conflicting opinions in the beginning of the problem formulation and an 
emergence of political activities in the process of solving the problem. Likewise, Lyles 
(1981) argues that uncertainty related to some points of an issue could increase 
politicality in the problem formulation stage.   
Decision motive 
The way in which executives classify and label a strategic decision as an opportunity 
or as a crisis greatly affects the decision making processes which follow (Schneider & 
Meyer, 1991). For example, Papadakis, Kaloghirou and Itarelli (1999) conducted 
research in a chemical company and proved that when managers identified the decision 
as a crisis they avoided political debate, focusing on facts and ideas. Nonetheless, when 
the crisis retreated, a number of political activities surfaced (Papadakis, Kaloghirou & 
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Itarelli, 1999). Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) argue that decision makers 
are more rational when the decision is perceived as a crisis, while they are prone to 
respond to opportunities without using rational and analytical processes, a notion 
supported also by Fredrickson’s (1985) research.    
 
2.7 Executives and Company Characteristics 
 
The moderating role of characteristics related to the internal and external environment 
of a company in the managerial strategic decision making process are followingly 
examined. 
Company size 
Snyman and Drew (2003) have described that company size can affect the strategic 
decision making process in a company, in such a way that larger firms will utilize a 
more formal and rational approach. Elbanna and Child (2007) claim that in small 
companies, the formulation of strategy depends on the idiosyncratic capabilities of a 
single or few individuals. Khatri and Ng (2000) argue that company size may interact 
with intuition, so that small organizations are prone to rely more on intuition than large 
ones. On the same note, Brouthers, Andriessen and Nicolaes (1998) suggest that 
managers in small firms tend to rely on their intuition and disregard collected 
information or conducted analysis. 
Firm performance 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) argue that in high-velocity environments, high-
performing companies employ more rational decision making processes, suggesting 
that the more rational the strategic decision making process, the better the performance 
of the firm. Other authors, for example Rodrigues and Hickson (1995), claim that the 
success of a decision depends on the availability of both resources, such as money, 
material and technology, all of which indicate good performance, and information, 
which is linked to rationality. 
Environmental uncertainty 
Fredrickson (1983) claims that in a stable environment, synoptic processes, like 
rationality, are favourable, whereas in an unstable environment, incremental processes, 
like intuition, should be used. This is due to the fact that in a stable environment 
information is more available and reliable, there is less pressure to collect new 
information, and the cost of collecting information is sensible. Thus, decisions based 
on facts and figures may lead to better performance than decisions based on judgment 
or gut-feeling (Khatri & Ng, 2000). 
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2.8 Theoretical Framework 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the role of intuition in a strategic decision 
making context. To accomplish that, a theoretical model was constructed, based on the 
integrated model designed by Elbanna and Child (2007). According to our model, 
strategic decision making was approached by its three different dimensions, rationality, 
political behaviour and intuition. These concepts were filtered through the moderating 
lenses of decision-specific characteristics and company characteristics. The outcome of 
this process aspires to provide a clear depiction of the role of intuition in a managerial 
strategic decision making sense. The aforementioned model is presented in the 
following figure. 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Research Philosophy 
 
According to Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2012), individuals make assumptions in 
every phase of a research, and this affects the overall way they understand the research 
questions, the data collection and how they elaborate the findings. Creswell (2014) talks 
about philosophical worldview assumptions, meaning all the basic beliefs that a 
researcher holds during the research work, in other words, the general philosophical 
orientation towards reality. According to Creswell (2014), researchers need to make 
clear what philosophical idea behind the study has been utilized. This enables them to 
clarify why a certain method approach has been chosen (Creswell, 2014). 
This study was conducted utilizing a constructivist philosophical worldview. According 
to Creswell (2014), constructivism is typical in qualitative researches. Following this 
view, individuals, and in this specific study we are referring to top managers, are the 
ones that try to understand the world surrounding them by personal or subjective 
meanings (Creswell, 2014). This study was therefore mainly focused on getting 
different views and meanings of the same subject from all the executives interviewed. 
Creswell (2014) indicates that the constructivist view aims to get complex answers, and 
a way to do this is by utilizing open ended questions.  
Creswell (2014) claims the researcher’s aim in the philosophical view of the 
constructivism is to give a meaning and to interpret the way other people see the world. 
This study tries to make sense of the personal views of the executives interviewed by 
interpreting their meanings concerning the strategic decision making process, through 
real life case examples.  
  
3.2 Research Approach 
 
The present thesis research was conducted with an abductive approach, since data, in 
the form of qualitative interviews, were collected to explore a phenomenon, recognise 
themes and explain patterns, in order to complement the existing theory (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). Unlike the deductive approach, where a researcher moves 
from theory to data, or the inductive approach, where a researcher moves from data to 
theory, in the abductive approach one needs to move back and forth, combining 
deduction and induction in a sense (Suddaby, 2006). For the sake of this study, the 
phenomenon to be analysed is intuition in a strategic decision making context, and 
known premises about this phenomenon are used to produce testable conclusions 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012).  
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3.3 Research Design 
 
The current study implements a qualitative research design. This technique is employed 
to describe any data collection or data analysis that generates or uses non-numerical 
data (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). In management research, the use of language 
data provides the opportunity “to gain insights into social and organizational realities” 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2015, p. 129). The exploratory study approach 
was exercised, which is suitable when uncertainty about the precise nature of a problem 
is identified (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). According to Creswell (2014), 
qualitative research is meant to be exploratory.   
The research strategy applied is the qualitative case study, which “facilitates 
exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources” (Baxter 
& Jack, 2008, p. 544). According to Yin (2003), there are four distinctive conditions 
which favour the use of a case study: 
 When the study focuses on answering “how” and “why” questions. 
 When the researcher cannot manipulate the behaviour of the people involved in 
the study. 
 When the researcher needs to investigate contextual conditions, relevant to the 
phenomenon under study. 
 When the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are ambiguous. 
Since our research will contain more than one single case, the selected method is the 
multiple-case study. The logic behind the use of multiple cases is based on whether 
results can be replicated among cases (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). Baxter and 
Jack (2008) claim that the multiple-case study is used when the researcher examines 
several cases in order to understand the similarities and differences among the cases. 
The evidence produced by a multiple-case study is considered to be reliable and robust, 
but on the other hand it can also be very time consuming and costly (Baxter & Jack, 
2008).  
The time constraints for conducting this research and the collection of data over a short 
period of time imposed the choice of a cross-sectional study, serving as a snapshot of a 
particular phenomenon at a particular time (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). 
 
3.4 Literature Selection 
 
The review of the literature was conducted by a selection of several authors on the 
strategic decision making field in the last decades. The strategic decision making topic 
is a very broad area with implications not just in management, but also in many other 
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subjects such as psychology, sociology, mathematics, and economics. Starting from the 
broad concept of decision making, this research aimed to narrow down the subject in 
order to make sense of a specific topic, which is the strategic decision making process 
in executives and the role that intuition plays in it.  
This research examined strategic decision making in the business world from a time 
frame perspective. Looking at the evolution of this concept resulted in further 
understanding the directions this phenomenon took during the past decades and the 
current state of the research. Gaining an insight into what has been done until now is 
crucial in order to comprehend the possible future outcomes and direction of the 
research.   
The collection of relevant literature was made mainly through revising several scientific 
journals about management, executives and organizations. The time frame this research 
took into account goes from the 1950’s until the most recent years. The main core of 
the research is based on previous studies conducted mainly in the last two decades. This 
provided a more reliable support for our conceptual analysis which is based on the most 
modern and updated studies on the strategic decision making field. When writing the 
review, another important point was that the selection was based on the most cited 
authors and articles. 
 
3.5 Data Collection Method 
 
In order to support our conceptual framework we conducted a series of semi-structured 
interviews, meaning that they were based on a set of questions that were prepared 
beforehand, but the interviewees were encouraged to reflect on their personal 
experiences, so that better insights could be gained. The choice of discursive interviews 
was made in line with our qualitative data method and our research philosophy. 
According to Creswell (2014), the constructivists approach aims at looking for the 
meanings that individuals give to a specific experience they had, and therefore, the best 
way to collect qualitative data in by discussion and open ended questions. The interview 
questions were formulated taking into account the three main aspects of analysis; the 
strategic decision making dimensions, the strategic decision-specific characteristics and 
the company characteristics, as presented in the model of the theoretical framework, in 
Chapter 2.   
The interviews were conducted directly in the main offices of the companies. All the 
interviews were recorded and their duration was between 40 and 48 minutes. The 
interview questions, aimed at collecting this relevant information, have been elaborated 
by ourselves and comprised of 25 questions. This basic set of questions provided us 
with general, as well as complex information about the participants. The interview 
questions were also written taking into account the particular role and professional 
background of the participants. Given that all of them were executives, holding a top 
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management position, we decided to use the same basic set of questions for all of them. 
According to each specific case we would, then, integrate more specific questions in 
the interview. 
The interview questions (see Appendix) were structured in different parts. The first part, 
or the introduction part, aimed at gaining general information about the position and 
the role of the participant, the organizational structure of the company, the performance 
of the company, and relevant facts about the internal and the external environment in 
which the organization operates. The relevance of gaining this information can be found 
in the fact that they provide a background of the executives and the environment in 
which they operates. Furthermore, the relation between these characteristics and the 
strategic decision making process, as well as the role of intuition, could be extremely 
relevant for the aim of the research. The second part of the interview questions 
concerned the introduction to the heart of the study, the strategic decision making 
process. The participants were asked to make an example of a successful strategic 
decision making in which they were involved in the past. By focusing the attention on 
a specific example provided a more reliable set of data, avoiding abstract 
conceptualization regarding general strategic decisions. In this second section, there are 
three sub groups of question. The first sub group is aimed at understanding the 
extension of the rationality approach in that particular situation. The second sub group 
aimed at exploring the role of intuition and the implication that personal judgements 
and professional experience had in that specific case. The last sub group of questions 
was aimed at understanding the role of the power between the members of the 
management group in which the specific strategic decision was taken. The last part of 
the interview questions aimed at exploring past strategic decisions that proved to be 
unsuccessful and the identified differences with the previous example. By submitting 
this set of questions to the participant we tried to gather reliable qualitative data in order 
to support our conceptual analysis. 
The present multiple-case study examined each executive as a different case, focussing 
on their individual strategic decision making processes. Therefore, the spotlight was 
turned on each manager, rather than the organization. A total of five executives 
belonging to five different companies participated in the research and the interviews 
were conducted in Malmö, Lund and Lomma, in the region of Skåne, Sweden.  
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 Table 1 - Research Participants and Interview Details       
Name Position Company Duration 
Christer Wahlquist President & CEO Nolato AB 40 min 
Karin Wehlin CEO BoMill AB 40 min 
Carl Magnus Cronholm CEO FEW  46 min 
Fritiof Johansson* CFO BetaValue* 48 min 
Sam Aston CEO Additude AB 42 min 
(*Participant’s details were changed to guarantee confidentiality) 
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
 
Owing to the fact that concepts in qualitative research depend on social interpretation, 
qualitative data have the tendency to be more ambiguous, elastic and complex than 
quantitative data, so analysis of the data ought to be responsive to these attributes to be 
meaningful (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). The data analysis procedure entails 
a process of summarising data, categorising and grouping them according to themes, 
and finally connecting these categories in such a way that a structure is formed to 
answer the research questions (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012).  The interviews 
conducted for the purpose of this research were audio-recorded and subsequently 
transcribed, making use of the online transcription and dictation software Transcribe 
(2017), in order to perform the transcriptions in a time-efficient way. The transcriptions 
were performed by the authors, so that better insights about their personal interviewing 
style would be gained, whereas the social and emotional perspectives of the interviews 
could be reminded during the transcriptions and an initial analysis of the meaning could 
commence (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015).  
The analytical process that was employed in the current study was inspired by the 
suggestions of Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012), which can be summarized in the 
following steps: identify categories or codes to understand the data, develop further 
analytical categories to pinpoint relationships and patterns, develop testable arguments 
and, finally, draw and verify conclusions. In the beginning, the acquired data were 
divided into 7 categories, based on the structure of the interview questions which the 
participants were called to answer. While processing the data, and in respect of the 
research questions, 5 core categories were formulated, in such a way that the research 
purpose could be addressed sufficiently. Building on this analysis and the discussion 
that it initiated, the researchers were able to draw their conclusions on this study.       
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3.7 Data Quality 
 
According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) there are data quality issues 
associated with semi-structured interviews that need to be overcome in this kind of 
research. These data quality issues are associated with reliability, forms of bias, 
generalisability and validity (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). 
The first problem discussed by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) is the concern 
about reliability. This is due to the fact that semi-structured or in depth interviews lack 
of a standardisation process. According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) this 
problem is overcome by the fact that qualitative researches are based on the assumption 
that the situations to be explored are complex and dynamic.  Furthermore, the findings 
of this kind of research approaches do not need to be always repeatable because they 
come from a specific reality and a particular time, that could also change (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). The authors believe that this study is a snapshot of the 
examined situation at a specific, and limited, time frame, though it is structured in such 
a way that could be repeatable in the future by other researchers. 
Connected to reliability is the problem of biases. According to Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill (2012) there are three different kinds of biases that must be considered. The 
first one is the bias of who conducts the interview. This is related to the behavioural 
approach of the interviewer, that through comments or a certain attitude might influence 
the way the participants answer the questions posed (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 
2012). Another issue is connected to the interviewee bias, that can be called also 
response bias.  Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) note that this kind of bias may be 
linked either to the perception about the interviewer or to the typical characteristics of 
the interview process. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) argue that the semi-
structured interview process, as well as the in-depth one, is characterized by an intrusion 
into the personal sphere of the participant. Even though they might be willing to 
contribute with personal experiences, in some cases they might be sensitive in the 
disclosure of certain information through an unstructured interview process (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). The problem in this case is that the participant would give 
only a partial picture of the situation to be explored. The last form of bias analysed by 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) is the participation bias. This kind of bias is 
related to the nature of the individuals who agree to participate in the research 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). In other words, the interview process takes time 
and this factor might affect negatively the will of the participants to participate 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012).  
During this study we tried to overcome the biases connected to the interviewer and the 
participants with different measures. According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 
(2012) one way to overcome these issues is to have a good degree of knowledge about 
the organization and the culture of the company. Before each interview we looked for 
information on the company’s website and other different sources, such as online 
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articles and news. In such a way we became more familiar with the situation at hand. 
Another way to overcome these biases was to provide the least information possible 
about our research to the participants, before conducting the interview. This method 
allowed us to have a more reliable set of data. The interviews were conducted in the 
main offices of the companies, in quiet conference rooms, which enabled the interview 
process to be more professional and therefore the answers to be more accurate.  Our 
behaviour during the interviews was also central in trying to overcome these biases. 
The interviews were conducted in a careful way in order to avoid leading questions that 
would compromise the reliability of our data. Overall, we tried to keep a neutral 
behaviour in order to reduce to the minimum extent possible our influence on the 
participants. 
A third problem connected to the semi-structured interview process is the 
generalisability issue. This problem is related to the extension of the research findings 
that might not be applicable to other fields of the research (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill, 2012). According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) this problem is 
overcome by the fact that qualitative research is related to the theoretical framework 
chosen for the study. This research strived to demonstrate that our findings have a solid 
meaning from a theoretical perspective.  
The last issue that Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) consider is the validity 
problem. This relates to the level of extension that the interviewers had in exploring the 
interviewee’s knowledge and experience, and how they made sense of it (Saunders, 
Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). We attempted to overcome this issue and explore the specific 
situation by making in-depth questions on the subject we believed relevant for the 
study. This allowed a more thorough analysis and a more extended exploration of the 
participant’s knowledge. 
Triangulation, as Long and Johnson (2000) indicate, refers to the utilization of various 
data sources, data collection methods, or investigators, in order to tackle the drawbacks 
of using any single source, method or investigator. Other scholars, like for 
example  Hammersley and Atkinson (1995), claim triangulation does not provide hard 
evidence on whether the data are true or false, since observing different sources or 
employing different methods may as well lead to a different phenomenon. There are 
several elements related to the design of a case study, so that the quality and 
trustworthiness of the project can be increased. According to DiCenso, Guyatt and 
Ciliska (2005), a researcher is responsible to guarantee that the research questions of 
the case study are clearly defined, the case study design is suitable for the research 
questions, purposeful sampling strategies have been utilized, data are collected and 
processed in a systematic way and the data analysis in done properly.  Triangulation of 
data sources, types or researchers, Baxter and Jack (2008) claim, is a useful strategy to 
support the principle in case study research, so that each phenomenon is analysed from 
various perspectives. Additional strategies which contribute to the overall credibility 
include “the use of reflection or the maintenance of field notes and peer examination of 
the data” (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 556). In this study, triangulation was achieved 
24 
 
through a delegation of interviews and tasks. Out of the five interviews, two of them 
were conducted by a single and different researcher, while the other three were 
conducted by both researchers, but particular tasks were rotated. More specifically, 
during these interviews, one researcher would commence by posing the questions, 
while the other would keep notes about the most interesting comments of the participant 
or facial expressions and emotional characteristics. After the middle of the interview, 
roles were exchanged, thus minimizing the drawbacks of a single interviewer.    
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4. Analysis 
 
In order to answer the formulated research questions, 5 categories were designed, 
following the three main aspects of analysis; the strategic decision making dimensions, 
the strategic decision-specific characteristics and the company characteristics, as 
explained in the theoretical framework. These categories are presented below. 
 
 4.1 Strategic Decisions Examined 
 
During this research different successful strategic decisions were analyzed, as presented 
in the current chapter. 
Christer Wahlquist 
The first participant interviewed was Christer Wahlquist, CEO of Nolato AB. The kind 
of strategic decisions that the CEO is required to make together with his group concerns, 
first of all, the acquisition of new companies. According to Wahlquist almost every year 
or second year Nolato acquires new companies. Another important strategic decision is 
the long term focus of the different business areas or the group in general. Which means 
the development of the three divisions in which Nolato is divided: “for example, some 
years ago we decide to grow the medical and the industrial business area faster than 
the telecom business area (integrated solutions) in order to balance the volatility of the 
overall company” (Wahlquist). And again another example of strategic decision is 
when: “some years ago we broadened the integrated solutions in order to broaden our 
base of business from only the telecom sector to sectors around the telecom. The 
decision was made, also in this case, to reduce the volatility of the company and create 
some stable business around this area as well” (Wahlquist).  
One of the main successful strategic decisions made by the CEO was the development 
of the medical business area. Nolato is structured in three main business areas: medical 
solutions, industrial solutions and integrated (telecommunication) solutions. The 
strategic decision to invest in the medical business area was made due to necessity, 
because it was a sector that was not growing as expected and it was producing deficits. 
The strategic decision was in this case to create a new business around the medical area 
and to focus more on key customers instead of going wide. “The first strategic decision 
was to try to make something good out of the medical division. We created a new 
business area around that, it was very small but we also created the process of creating 
people that could make decisions around the medical and could decide for themselves. 
At that time we also decided to focus on key customers, instead of going wide. We went 
for a very customer focused approach” (Wahlquist). 
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The role of Christer Wahlquist is to review and give comments to the strategic plans 
proposed by the single divisions and to create an overall strategic plan for the group. 
Nolato has many daughter companies and this makes the strategic planning more 
complex as it is divided across different levels. In the overall organization there are 
twenty daughter companies and every year, each of them has to present a strategic plan 
focusing on the upcoming three years. According to Wahlquist, the task of the 
management of each daughter company is to propose a strategic plan, while his task is 
to review them, give comments, and make sure that those strategic plans come together 
in a bigger plan: “This is the base of the strategic planning. Then each business area 
does the strategic plan based on the inputs from the daughter companies, to create an 
overall strategic path for the business area. And then we do one for the group. So we 
have three levels of strategic planning, all focused on three to five years, and they are 
updated every year.” 
According to Christer Wahlquist, the strategic decisions that he and his group have to 
make are continuously developed through a time process and changed when needed: 
“In Nolato most of the strategic decisions are sort of evolved. It’s not like very sharp 
decisions that we decide one day. We are not a revolutionary company, we are more of 
an evolution company. We are not changing very rapidly in direction, we are more 
gradually moving ourselves in a direction. So we know this is the direction and so we 
make decisions over time. And exactly the final decision in that aspect is hard to say, 
because it’s evolving over time.” 
The CEO of Nolato has to take into account also the differences between the three 
business divisions of the company, because each of them requires a different 
management style and a different approach to strategic decision making. The integrated 
solutions business is for example developing much faster than the other two areas, and 
this requires a much faster adaptation, hence faster decision making. Wahlquist 
describes the two different perspectives: “For example in the medical area what we are 
doing today you will see the results in five years. In the integrated solutions business 
area, what we make today, you see definitely results within the year. So you need to be 
much more fast-moving in that.” 
According to Wahlquist, each business environment requires management people with 
different characteristics and skills: “More analytical long term in the medical area, and 
more fast movers in the integrated solutions. I would sometimes refer to it as a person 
running one hundred meters, very explosive, you just go and run. And then you have to 
take a new step and run again. In the medical area instead is more like a marathon, 
you have to consistently run at the same speed for hours and hours, but you don't 
explode. 
Concerning a strategic decision that did not result in a desired outcome, Wahlquist 
focused on the wrong assumptions that originally were part of the same strategic 
decision about the development of the medical business area. Once realized that those 
assumptions were proved wrong, Wahlquist recognized there was a need to change: 
”when we started the medical business area [...] we decided to divide the world into 
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regions and work with them separately as a region, we understood probably that's not 
gonna work. We didn't get the outcome we thought we would get, and then we 
changed”. 
  
Karin Wehlin 
Karin Wehlin, CEO of BoMill, when asked about the types of strategic decisions for 
her organization, she identified as such their patent strategy, price strategy, market 
strategy, sales strategy (for example partnering with distributors or not), and, especially, 
the customer segments that the company needs to target. 
Karin Wehlin argued that this specific decision was of utmost importance for BoMill, 
describing: 
“In this case, I would say it [the decision] was very important. If we had gone with a 
quality [strategic direction] we wouldn't have been where we are today. I mean we have 
sales today, even if we are not profitable, we have sales. And we get attention from big 
companies […] So I think it’s a correct strategic choice.” 
As far as the uncertainty of the decision is concerned, Karin Wehlin stated that it has 
been considerably high, because they are dealing with an innovative technology, a 
disruptive technology in a sense, and not a me-too product. The landscape was 
considered to be a relatively unknown territory for her, compared to the pharmaceutical 
sector she had been working for 10 years, before joining BoMill. On this point, she 
described: “But when you're introducing something that no one knows anything about 
and they don't know that they need it, then the strategy is full of uncertainties I would 
say.” The motive behind this decision was definitely an opportunity that was identified 
by Karin Wehlin and the board of directors. 
In the interview with Karin Wehlin, the successful strategic decision that was discussed 
involved the complete change of direction for the company’s strategy, from introducing 
the machinery to quality and regulatory managers, focusing solely on the quality aspect 
of the product, to approaching business decision makers and presenting clear business 
cases to the management teams, focussing on the added value the product could offer 
them. As Karin Wehlin described: 
“I would say that the successful strategic decision was to move 180 degrees as I 
described before, not going to the quality regulatory part of the grain area, but actually 
talking business cases and added value, like we can actually produce with the machine, 
and not quality as such. And I think that was very important for BoMill to make that 
switch.” 
Regarding the people who were involved in this decision, Karin Wehlin claimed that in 
her first period in the company, the people who were in charge at that time, lacked 
considerable expertise in the strategic aspect, since they were mostly researchers or 
developers, focused mainly on the development of their technology. So her course of 
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action was to create a plan for the future strategic direction of the company, utilizing 
knowledge from the executive MBA programme she had followed, and combining it 
with the acquired experience that the previous strategy had left. This strategic plan was 
then presented and approved by the board of directors.   
An unsuccessful strategic decision that was discussed with Karin Wehlin involved the 
choice of continuing the agreement with one distributor in East Europe, who was still 
utilizing a quality and regulatory sales approach, although she had already decided to 
move towards a management and business case approach. The contracts with all the 
other distributors were terminated, but committing to the company’s former strategy in 
East Europe, resulted in the company being unable to sell a single unit of their product 
in that area, so it has proven to be a wrong strategic decision.  
An additional strategic decision that Wehlin mentioned briefly was to hire two 
marketing and sales directors, instead of one, as was the original plan, after organising 
a fundraising, with the participation of a major Swedish venture capital firm. When 
realizing they had two very skilled candidates for the position, she suggested to the 
board of directors that both of them should be hired, since this decision could have a 
significant positive effect on the company’s presence in various markets.   
  
Carl Magnus Cronholm 
Carl Magnus Cronholm is the founder and CEO of the communication agency FEW, 
based in Malmö, Sweden. The types strategic decisions that the company was required 
to make concerned broadening the offer of competencies and specialties to clients: “I 
would say, some of the bigger decisions that we made in the past couple of years that 
have affected us and will continue to affect us are, first of all, the need to be an economy 
of scale, we need to level up our offering, [...] be able to offer more specialties and 
competencies”. Main decisions for the company, in this case, were the involvement of 
public relations to the company offers, as well as adding a film division.  
One of the main successful strategic decisions in which the CEO was involved is the 
merger with another company in 2015: “the next big decision was in 2014 when we said 
we need to get big, because we can never make money being a small agency. Back then 
we were twenty/twenty-five persons, so we needed to find someone and marry them. So 
we talked with another company and we had the merger in January 2015, and doubled 
the size basically”.    
The strategic decision of merging with another company was mainly opportunity 
driven, and it was a crucial decision for the company’s future: “we were not in a crisis 
that year, but we had been one year before. The reason that I contacted them at that 
point was that I read on a magazine that their CEO was about to go and become a 
managing director for a football club in Malmö so I thought it was a good time to 
actually start the discussion”.  
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According to the CEO, even though the company was not in a crisis situation it was 
necessary to take this step in order to be able to be less dependent from the key clients 
and grow bigger in order to make more profits: “We have been discussing internally 
[...] we can never get rich if we are this size, because we will always be so dependent 
on a few clients [...]. We needed to unleash ourselves from that kind of dependence [...]. 
In 2012, one of our biggest client was 60% of our turnover, [...] the year after, they 
dropped to 50% in the turnover, and it was a big blast for us”. Other reasons concerned 
the perception of the company from the client’s perspective, especially big 
organizations that perceived the company to be too small in order to fulfill the project 
duties: “you probably know about this big energy company, we had a big pitch for them 
in 2013, we were down to the final 2, and we lost it because even though they really 
liked our ideas and we had what it takes to work with them, we were too small”, and 
again:  “6 months later, we had another global pitch for a big tools company, we were 
number 7 on the list, up against 18 or some of the world's best agencies, and once again 
they pulled us out because we were too small”. According to Carl Magnus Cronholm 
this strategic decision had also an emotional involvement due to these previous 
elements: “It was so frustrating to have the knowledge to deliver, and to be able to 
compete with some of the best companies on the planet, but not being able to do the 
game and show off your skills”. The level of uncertainty connected to this decision was 
relatively high, especially regarding the revenue aspects. He believed in the decision to 
a great extent, as he was confident that it could grow the company substantially.  
As an example of a strategic decision that did not result in the desired outcome, the 
CEO of FEW talked about a filming company they created to improve the offer. The 
reasons behind this strategic decision was to provide a new service to the already 
existing clients, by producing films in a more economical way than the commercial 
production. The expectations in this case were based on the idea of growing this sector 
by reaching seven or ten units in the agency, instead of the initial two. According to 
Carl Magnus Cronholm: “our idea was that if we add this offer we can grow the film 
side of the company really fast. Because it's cheap and it's fast and there should be a 
lot of clients that would be interested in this, and we already have these clients with 
whom we work with and that can buy this. But no, in this case even though it's profitable 
it's not growing [...]. So in that case, the decision making, or the assumptions that we 
did in the beginning did not prove to be true”.  
  
Fritiof Johansson 
Johansson provided his definition of what a strategic decision is, stating that many 
people in the business use the term “strategic” for pretty minor issues. He explained 
that, in his opinion, a strategic decision is one that decides the overall direction of the 
group as a whole, so a decision by an individual business unit, for example, can hardly 
be considered as strategic, rather than a tactical adaptation to a general strategic 
direction. He provided an example of a strategic decision for his company, suggesting: 
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“I would say a strategic direction is: are we going to expand the number of technologies 
that we offer as a group? We are today focused on separation technology, 
predominantly by means of centrifugal force, we are into heat transfer and we are into 
fluid handling. Those are our 3 main technologies. But let's say that we should be 
considering going into a fourth technology, that's definitely a high-level strategic 
decision. That's a decision that is really to be agreed with our board of directors.” 
Another example of a strategic decision, taking into account the geographical 
perspective, is mentioned by Johansson: 
“If we then think about geographical dimensions, let's assume that we would be 
considering a larger scale presence investments in Angola. If we would be saying we 
want to spend 200 million on setting up supply chains, and sales presence, and god 
knows what, in Angola, I would say that is as strategic decision for the company. But, 
setting up a rep office in Belarus, is more of a tactical thing.” 
As a CFO of the company, and a member of the group management, Johansson is 
involved in all the major strategic decisions of the organization, contributing based on 
his responsibilities on the financial aspects of the decision. 
In the interview, he described a successful strategic decision that was made in the 
company, specifically the acquisition of a pump manufacturing company, the largest 
ever acquisition in the history of the company. The company was privately owned, with 
its main offices in Norway, having a turnover in the order of 5 billion SEK and very 
successful performance-wise. BetaValue paid a price of 14 billion SEK for this 
acquisition, and the basis of this decision was to enlarge their offering to the marine 
industry, with fluid handling technology. It was a major decision, both because of its 
sheer size, but also due to the fact that big scale fluid handling technology into the 
marine industry was a new territory for the company. Eventually, the acquired company 
generated better that was anticipated in terms of volume, as well as in terms of profit, 
so the decision was undoubtedly the right one. 
In this decision process, apart from Johansson, the others members who took part were 
the CEO, the Head of Business Development, the Head of Marine Division, together 
with employees responsible for due diligence in the legal area, external lawyers, 
external advisors,  and manufacturing and procurement specialists. Johansson agreed 
with the strategic decision to a high extent, as everybody in the group, even though 
there were some minor elements he would have done slightly differently.   
Johansson provided an additional example of a strategic decision, where the company 
launched a strategic review, to define a new way of operating. They examined the 
various dimensions inside the company that were performing well, stalling or not 
working at all. They analysed the company regarding its technologies, the customers, 
the end-user industries, the development and the expected development from a macro 
perspective.  The result was to turn 90 degrees and go alongside the product, so instead 
of presenting the whole spectrum of the company’s products to a specific industry, they 
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decided to offer product groups to a variety of industries, strengthening the technology 
product focus.   
When asked about the uncertainty of the decision, Johansson claimed that, first of all, 
the company which was acquired was located in the Nordic region, so the cultural risk 
involved was smaller than acquiring, for example, a Chinese company, since they 
obtain a much larger understanding of the culture, due to the similar background. 
Regarding the type of the end-user industries, in this case the marine, oil and gas, and 
offshore industries, they were familiar to the organization, because of their involvement 
in them from other products and application, so again, a limited risk. Moreover, as 
regards the technology, the company had experience in this aspect from previous 
applications, even though they were of much smaller scale than in this case, so 
technology-wise the risk was also limited.    
From Johansson’s point of view, the strategic decision was triggered by two factors. 
Firstly, there was a shift of generation on the selling side, which BetaValue identified 
as an opportunity to get into transaction mode. Secondly, it had been a company goal 
to enlarge their offering towards the marine industry with technologies that they felt 
comfortable with, and at the same time acquiring a high-performing company.  
 
Sam Aston 
Sam Aston is the CEO of Additude, a headhunting and consulting company operating 
in the business area of Malmö, Sweden. The CEO described the strategic decisions that 
his company has to take as those decisions that set the way the company is going. The 
type of strategic decisions that the company needs to make can be described as: “if we 
start off with a new market, or a new service, invest in a new way or buy a company or 
something, that is a strategic decision, decision that takes longer time to execute and 
longer time to see the consequences also” (Aston). 
One of the most successful strategic decision made by Sam Aston was when they started 
to offer a new service to clients. The reasons behind this strategic decision was to 
differentiate the company’s services from other competitors:  “We started with a new 
service, which was complementary to our other services. We had one service which is 
headhunting and one service that is to start off with consultancy services. And then we 
decided to also start off with a service that is in between, which is hiring consultants 
that could be employed for the customer, which was quite beneficial for both us and the 
customers” (Aston). This strategic decision, in which Aston had been a major 
supporter, revealed to be successful, because it made the company to be perceived as 
different from other competitors and offering a unique service:  “that was a good choice 
for us, that really made us differ from all our competitors, that's a service nobody else 
has, nobody else does really good” (Aston). The strategic decision was crucial for the 
success of the company, that could therefore benefit of a new position between two 
different markets: “So you find companies that have consultancy services and they 
compete with us, and then you find recruiting services, which also could compete with 
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us. But the combination of those 2, a headhunting service and a specialist consultancy 
service, you don't find that” (Aston).  
Such a strategic decision was not free of any complications. Sam Aston described this 
process as complex in the way that could create conflicts in the organization itself: 
“Internally it's a little bit competitive, when finding a candidate, should this candidate 
go to a customer or should we hire that candidate for ourselves. So it's been a little bit 
of a hassle, but still it's working out quite well, and that's been a competitive advantage 
for us, for which we're quite glad for. It was a hard decision, but a good decision”.  
Regarding the people involved in this strategic decision making process, Sam Aston 
referred that the decision was taken together with the three other members of the board. 
Additude is an owner-driven company, the four owners are at the same time also the 
board members. Sam Aston, the CEO, even though he is not one of the founders, he 
still is one of the owners and a board member.  
This strategic decision to provide a new service was crucial for the perception of the 
brand and the market awareness of Additude: “The brand became somewhat more 
familiar to the market, which is good, and it has also given us a lot of customers. We 
had 40 new customers last year and we have got 17 new customers this year, to this 
date, and that's pretty good, I don't think our competitors are even close” (Aston). The 
level of importance of the decision can be understood by the fact that, according to 
Aston, their main competitors are satisfied with having five or six new customers per 
year, whereas in the case of Additude, thanks to this new service, they are able to gain 
around forty or fifty customers per year.  
According to Aston, the level of uncertainty for the strategic decision was relatively 
high, as it is in any strategic decisions: “So that’s what normally happens when you 
make these decisions, it's not as easy as black or white, and you don't see that, because 
then it would be quite easy to make strategic decisions. Aston notes that a big part of 
these uncertainties is due to the general changes of the environment, but also of the 
society: “The world is changing, the technology that we work with is changing quite a 
lot, [...], and people are also changing. So there are a lot of things that changed, which 
means that the only thing that you actually know is that the future will not be the same 
as today”. Therefore according to Aston there is a level of uncertainty in any decision, 
and the best way to approach these uncertainties is by having experience and good 
advisors around you: “It's extremely good to have a very skilled team around you, 
because the decisions you make, you can be responsible for taking that decision”. In 
addition to this, he claimed that the decision was driven by an opportunity, rather than 
a crisis.  
Another strategic decision that Aston took part in, dealt with the involvement of the 
employees in an effort to improve the brand image of a large consultancy firm where 
he was a member of the management team. They asked the personnel about how to 
become a consultancy firm of the future, and the feedback they got materialized in 1592 
different suggestions on what to do. Out of them, the management team created a top 
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100 list and worked on these ideas every year, creating almost 45 company-wide 
projects. The result was that the company started growing quite fast, from 1.2 billion 
SEK to 1.8 billion SEK in one year, to 2.4 billion SEK the following year, totally 
organic, investing in new services and a new presentation of the company.    
  
4.2 Findings on Rationality in Strategic Decision Making 
  
Christer Wahlquist 
A way to investigate the role of rationality in the decision making process is to explore 
the importance of the information used during this process. Executives, and generally 
management groups, process information in very different ways. For instance, in Nolato 
information is carefully analyzed, and the preference is on information collected by 
exploiting internal resources. According to the CEO, Wahlquist: “We talk to people 
internally and build up the knowledge or the information needed to make a decision. 
Then if it is a specific area, like going into new markets, new geography, or buy a 
company, then we do a lot of information collecting. Externally as well, but normally 
we have a lot of information so it is more to get all those information from internally to 
the table.” 
Regarding the use of analytical tools during the strategic decision making process, 
Wahlquist noted that he and his group utilize a variety of tools, but always exploiting 
internal resources, like for instance using their own salesmen and avoiding using 
external consulting companies or partners: “Yes of course we do for example risk 
analysis, scenario analysis, budgeting, different kind of analysis, we do SWOT, we do 
market research in some aspect but a lot of that is by our own people. So we use our 
salespeople for example. I strongly believe in using internal resources in collecting 
information, because if you take too much from the external, it’s someone else’s, it’s 
not part of the total knowledge in the company”. According to Wahlquist, this is also 
part of the company’s culture: “Our culture is more to use internal knowledge, canalize 
it, and then of course make a decision. By doing this you get also more commitment by 
the employees, because they feel part of that decision”. 
  
Karin Wehlin 
For Karin Wehlin, the amount of information available in the decision making process 
was limited, due to the fact that they have developed a new and innovative technology, 
that did not exist before. Their efforts mainly focused on analysing market data, for 
example, how much wheat is produced or milled in different countries, and also 
examine other advanced machinery in the industry, which has been used for kernel 
analysis.  
34 
 
While deliberating on which countries BoMill needs to target, at the early stages of the 
company, they examined the major durum wheat producers, since durum wheat is a 
premium product that can produce added value. These countries are Canada and 
Northern USA, Italy, France, Ukraine, India and China. Among these countries, they 
pinpointed Canada as a suiting candidate, both because it is a major durum country, and 
also that they knew by rumour Canada is an early adopter to new technologies, and 
USA tends to follow Canada’s lead when it comes to adopting new technologies. They 
perceived the size of the company as too small to compete in the Indian or Chinese 
market, which is why they still have not expanded on these countries. 
Concerning the focus on crucial information, Karin Wehlin believed the team has been 
very focused, but as it had been an early phase for BoMill, she considered it would be 
dangerous being too narrow in their strategy. She supported that a more broad and 
explorative approach was needed at the time, so that different parts of the value chain 
could be evaluated and the company would not miss their “sweet spot” (Wehlin).  
Collecting information about the market has been a vital part of Wehlin’s learning curve 
in the grain industry, since she attempted to educate herself on the grain industry, by 
subscribing to various industry newsletters for example, in order to gain a better insight 
on the field. Wehlin emphasized the importance of basing the decision process on facts, 
clearly stating: “The more facts you can put on the table to enable a sort of a sound 
decision, the better.” She found herself moving from a more gut-feeling approach in 
the beginning, when the information and knowledge about the industry were limited, to 
a rational approach later on, when she gained access to an abundance of data. As she 
stated: 
“And I said, gut-feeling yes, it's there as well, but it needs to be a mix I think, it was 
more gut-feeling in the beginning of my period at BoMill, and it's more fact-based now, 
because we have more facts to consider, not only the facts or information about the 
industry as such, we had the facts from customers and how they make decisions, and 
how they look at our technology and so forth.”   
She made a comparison to her background in the pharmaceutical industry, where she 
was familiar with the landscape and had to deal with a me-too product. There, 
everything could be calculated and analysed in advance. She also used the mobile phone 
as an example of a product where you can obtain a lot of information about the market 
and the technology in the beginning, whereas the case of an innovative product and the 
ambiguity that this situation entailed, forced her to start from using gut-feeling, but 
later, while the availability of information increased, moved on to a fact-based and 
rational approach, that she considered to be the most appropriate.    
In Wehlin’s opinion, the failed strategic decision to maintain the original strategy in 
East Europe was based on a rational reasoning, that the company’s attention should be 
focused on the North American and Western European markets, so for East Europe the 
expectations were set lower and she did not anticipate any major deals from that market. 
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The implementation of that decision could be considered as a benchmark, to make the 
distinction between the former approach and the new strategy.   
In the case of hiring two marketing and sales directors, Wehlin presented the relevant 
facts and figures to the board, on how this decision could have a positive financial 
impact on the company and improve their position in the market, consequently 
structuring a reasoning on a planned and rational ground. 
  
Carl Magnus Cronholm 
When making the strategic decision to merge with another company, the CEO of FEW 
used different tools in order to back the decision that was already made: “we kept trying 
to find some rational arguments to support that feeling”. Furthermore, Cronholm 
clarified that for him an important analytical tool during this strategic decision making 
process was having a good financial advisor. Cronholm added that: “of course we 
looked at numbers, we had done some research in the marketplace to actually develop 
some specific idea about where the industry was going, and what our place could be in 
that transformation. We had some reports as well that we looked through to back our 
decision”. 
  
Fritiof Johansson 
The first strategic decision that Fritiof Johansson described was based on a thorough 
and analytical research process, where almost 300 pumping companies were examined. 
Through a selection process, master students were used to process the vast amount of 
data, and eventually the company funneled the initial number down to 15 companies, 
among which there was the one that was acquired in the end. Discussing about this 
process, Johansson stated: “So quite a comprehensive process of course, involving, 
corporate finance advice, and a lot of evaluation exercises, due diligence across all the 
different elements of running a company and so on.”   
He mentioned that during this extensive analysis, they looked at the market related to 
the acquired company’s products, they reviewed the different shares among the 
competitors and the state of the technology compared to alternative technologies, so a 
lengthy examination of the business as a whole. Johansson believed that the group had 
been quite efficient to disregard the less relevant or less important information in this 
case.    
His general belief about the strategic decision making process was that numbers must 
support you at all times. As he specifically claimed: 
“[...] in that case you have to be cold when it comes to the numbers. You have to start 
with making sure that from an operational perspective it works. The fundamental 
question in this particular type of decision is: why does BetaValue become a better 
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owner of this company. If you can come up with solid arguments; not just the wishy-
washy it's a strategic thing, and we believe it's good, that's not good enough.” 
Regarding the second strategic decision, Johansson claimed that “[...] it was a needed 
change from internal analysis”, in an effort to change direction and focus on their own 
technologies, since many skilled individuals in their staff gained a good insight on 
customers and the end-user industries over the past years, but were pretty shallow when 
it came to BetaValue’s products and technologies.  
An overview of Johansson’s highly rational approach on strategic decision making can 
be described in the following lines: 
“If someone says: I do not have emotions involved in the decision making, then they're 
lying. But we have to be honest to ourselves and numbers are good because they are 
not lying, I should say that as a finance man, but I think everybody agrees when they 
really think about it. But then of course you have to contain the emotions. You have to 
be honest to yourself, and that's why it's important that you have enough individuals 
involved with different enough views or perspectives on a particular situation. 
Otherwise, there is a risk that if you're alone, or if you're only two thinking the same 
way, it would be wrong.” 
  
Sam Aston 
Regarding the role of information in the strategic decision making process that brought 
Additude to provide an innovative service for its clients, and how extensive was the 
conducted analysis, the CEO recognized that this field could be improved: “I would say 
we could probably do better about that, of course we're looking at what the customers 
are doing, what technological trends we see, and of course we're definitely looking at 
market trends, and what end users are experiencing, but I would guess we could do 
quite more on that”.   
Concerning the use of analytical tools in the strategic decision making process, Sam 
Aston claimed that the way the company is looking at analysis and market trends is 
different compared to other organization. He stated: “Definitely we are looking into 
market trends, if it's a good economy or not, procurement index, to see if the market is 
growing or decreasing, technology trends. You also see customers doing investments 
in certain areas, you have internet, digitization, and what does that actually mean? 
How could we be a part of that? So we do that, but we're probably not looking into 
analysis reports in that sense.” 
Discussing about the strategic decision of involving the employees in the future 
development of the company’s brand image, Aston claimed that the company 
performed a number of studies to support their decision, for example, on what was the 
awareness of the brand compared to the competitors, what was the personnel’s 
perception of the company, what was their performance, etc. They utilized both internal 
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and external reports, and succeeded in formulating a strategy through measurable goals, 
which enabled for the actions to be controlled and to identify deviations.  
  
4.3 Findings on Political Behaviour in Strategic Decision 
Making 
  
Christer Wahlquist 
When considering the influence that personal goals and ambitions could have on the 
strategic decision making process, Christer Wahlquist mentioned that a way to 
overcome this is by shaping the decision through different layers: “In the executive 
group, to make a decision to grow a specific area in front of the others is a rather easy 
process, and everybody could from that level agree or not, based on some decisions. 
Then, you take how to do it away from that group, and you ask someone else to prepare 
that sort of strategy, and then in that group they all have the same goal. So you break 
down the decision in order to get those sort of personalized approaches away.  
According to Wahlquist his company has a culture of openness between its members 
and this helps to reduce certain political behaviours. He also supported this value to a 
great extent: “I strongly believe everybody in the company has the right to have an 
opinion, and I am very interested in people's opinion. I am very interested to listen: 
what do you think about this? What is your input? We are very good at listening to 
people and, of course, not everybody's interest could be met in the decision, but we are 
listening and we give feedback.” 
When asked if the strategic decision could be affected by the use of power, given the 
position he holds in the company, Wahlquist stated that there is a possibility that 
indirectly this could happen. According to him: “There is a certain level of people 
always listening to the boss, that is in the nature of people. So if I say ok, I think we 
should do something, then people tend to move that way just by me saying it.” 
Nevertheless, this is to some extent very limited by the company’s culture that is more 
consensus driven. Wahlquist explained that: “I very seldom overrule people in the sense 
of me saying ok you are wrong, this is the way. We are much more a consensus 
company, I believe in the group as a function rather than the person in charge. And I 
think this is to a big extent a Swedish management style.” According to Wahlquist, the 
Swedish management culture plays an important role in reducing political behaviours 
in the management groups. This is also something he explained with different 
examples, by comparing it with other management environments: “We feel that when 
we acquire companies abroad they would usually ask, so what's your decisions? And 
we reply for them to come with a suggestion, you are the acquired company, you know 
your market, you understand, and I will listen. Of course we approve investments, but 
you have to make the plan. In the beginning they are always uncertain of that role, 
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because they are used to someone from headquarter coming in and deciding. That's not 
my way of doing business.” 
When it comes to negotiations between the management group, the CEO preferred to 
approach them mostly as discussions. The strategic decision analysed for instance, 
evolved as a result of a discussion rather than negotiations between the members. 
According to Wahlquist, the management group did not have a political behaviour, and 
the same could be applied for the company as a whole. The group has been very 
consensus driven and this helped to reduce conflicts, and at the same time even in the 
case that someone did not fully agree on the strategic decision, the group was always 
aligned and respected that decision. Wahlquist explained: “I would say our culture is 
very non-political. So we don't have much conflict in that way. Of course if someone 
behaves badly then we are very clear. I would say this is not ok, we are like a family, 
we treat each other well. And I treat my family at home in the same way. The family 
should stay together and support each other, if not that's not accepted”. 
  
Karin Wehlin 
Karin Wehlin suggested that her personal goals, or anybody’s in the board of directors, 
never affected the strategic decision process, the company’s goals have always been in 
front, steering the decisions. All the counterparts have been open about their interests 
in this process. Since the beginning, she has been collaborating closely with the founder 
of the company, to guarantee that the common vision will continue to be everybody’s 
top priority.      
Wehlin described that there was an open discussion and limited use of power when 
deliberating the strategic decision, the management valued teamwork, as “there is a 
very low power distance in this company”, an attribute she identified as common for a 
Swedish organization.   
  
Carl Magnus Cronholm 
In the strategic decision to merge the two companies, Cronholm explained that from his 
perspective his goals were aligned with those of the company. From the group members 
perspectives he was aware that probably some of them could have had different reasons 
in order to complete the merge: “If you are such a big group, the 12 people I was talking 
about, they were all involved in the company in different roles. Not all of them were 
managers, some of them were just regular people working in the business and of course 
for them maybe the reasons could be to work with more experienced persons, to develop 
skills, in general to work in a bigger organization.” Cronholm is this case was aware 
that group members participating in the strategic decision making process could have 
different goals, and it was something that he believed must always be beared in mind. 
According to the CEO, knowing and understanding internal politics and its dynamics 
is very important in order to run an organization: “When you study you think that 
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decision making is always very rational, that people are always putting the best interest 
of the company first, but that never happens. People have their own agenda, some may 
think that if they do a certain thing maybe that could boost their career or whatever. 
But this doesn't help the company to sell more.” Cronholm explained that these 
dynamics are part of the strategic decision making process, and must always be 
considered when deliberating on a decision. The important thing is, therefore, not to 
lose focus on the main goal. 
When asked if he used his power or tried to influence other’s ideas in order to convince 
people to proceed with the merger, Cronholm explained that he was trying to convince 
mainly people from his own company. He avoided to influence and push too much to 
convince the other side of the merger because he felt it could have been harmful for the 
success of the operation: “I think that it would have been a great risk and the merging 
could have never put through. That is because on one hand I didn't know them very well 
at the time. [...] So if I had pushed too hard, without knowing their personal agenda, 
that would have been probably a disaster”. Therefore, based on this feeling, Cronholm 
focused on convincing and aligning to the strategic decision only his own group. 
Regarding the openness of the people participating in the strategic decision process that 
brought to the merger of the two companies, Cronholm explains: “From the side that I 
came from, I would say 95% open. From the other side in regard to us I would say 50%, 
maybe 60%.” A difference in the percentages is identified, since there was a lack of 
trust between the companies, and this can be explained by the fact that they did not 
know each other. According to Cronholm: “Trust is a weird thing, it's very hard to 
build, and very hard to ruin. In that process, even though we merged, we didn't know 
each other that well, so it's like when you get married and then start knowing the other 
person. And that is back to the intuition side of the things, the feeling was that we could 
probably have a good life together.” 
  
Fritiof Johansson 
Johansson appeared positive that, while deliberating the strategic decision, the group 
had been primarily focused on the organizational goals, while all the stakeholders 
employed an open dialogue and direct conversations about the benefits and pitfalls of 
certain aspects of this particular situation. He stated that it was more of a discussion 
between the members, rather than a negotiation, on how far they were prepared to go. 
  
Sam Aston 
Sam Aston claimed that there is always an element of thinking your own goals in the 
company, because he considered his organization to be quite goal-driven. In his case, 
having the role of the CEO, he was confident that his personal goals are in line with the 
overall goals of the company. He described the company as very open, and his belief is 
that the personnel should be involved as much as possible in the decision making 
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process, providing valuable feedback. Of course, the owners and the board have the 
power to make the strategic decisions, but ideas from the employees are well 
appreciated and occasionally implemented.   
  
4.4 Findings on Intuition in Strategic Decision Making 
  
Christer Wahlquist 
In the strategic decision making processes in which Wahlquist was involved, an 
important role was played by intuition. Professional experience revealed to be crucial 
in the way he processed information and made decisions. Wahlquist valued professional 
experience gained especially in Nolato through the years: “In the group we have people 
who worked here very long time, generally speaking people stay long in Nolato. That 
gives a lot of professional experience that we canalize, of course we have to question 
that sometimes and say ok this is how we’ve done it before, how can we change, how 
can we move in a new direction, creating new and more value.” 
Also the personal judgments seemed to be influential in the strategic decision making 
process in which Wahlquist was involved, and this is because, according to him, 
organizations and management groups are based on people first of all. Wahlquist 
explained that: “Because of all the influences you get on the topic you get that sort of 
feeling that you say this is the right way. It’s gonna go this way, and then we have a lot 
of input from customers, you get the feeling on how they react. And then judgment is 
influencing the strategic decision.” Even when confronting the choice between the 
outcome of the analytical tools and the personal gut-feeling, Wahlquist states that in 
this case: “I would rather trust my judgement than the analytical tools.” As an example 
to support this statement, Wahlquist explained the case of making a strategic decision 
in order to acquire a new company. In this example, he described that: “I think 
acquiring companies is black or white, you do it or you don’t. In that case you can do 
all kind of analytical research, and get different data, it is good or bad to go in that 
market for instance. But, my personal experience says that the success of the company 
is more based on people and the commitment, and that is very hard to get into analytical 
model. You can do it in some cases but there is always a judgement in the beginning.” 
Personal judgment in this case has an important value for Wahlquist, in fact he added 
that: “I judge you and I say, ok you have the power to create something, or I think 
maybe you don’t. That is a judgment that I do and I believe in that judgment.” 
Therefore, in this kind of situations, where the strategic decision is clearly black or 
white, such as the acquisition of a new company, personal judgements are crucial 
according to Wahlquist. He concluded: “You get a feeling about people. You feel 
commitment, you feel the values, you have to feel the values. I believe in that and it’s a 
big part.” 
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In the strategic decision concerning the development of the medical business area, 
professional experience also played a big part. After the decision to create something 
around the medical division was made, Wahlquist started analysing the potential of 
Nolato’s customers and started a strategic plan addressing different geographical 
markets. He started to work on the area of Europe, but soon realized that the company 
was too small to cover that market: “I realized ok this is not going to work, we are too 
small to sort of cover the market. Then I started changing that sort of view and I said 
ok let’s go for the geographical close area and let’s go for the big potential customers”. 
According to Wahlquist this change was due mainly because of his professional 
experience: “It was due to my experience. I started and felt that I had to change a little 
bit. [...] We tried and got some good feedback, so we changed the strategy. So the 
strategy of creating a bigger medical business was changed due to experience during 
the process.” Wahlquist believes that intuition and personal judgement play a big role 
in the strategic decision making process. On this point, he explained: “I much more 
believe being in the environment, in the market, talking to the customers, to competitors, 
to get your own influence. And then you collect that and make a decision based on your 
own judgement of the situation. Of course you base your judgment on influences but it's 
more going out to the market yourself instead of asking somebody to do an analysis and 
use a tool to sort of collect all the information.” 
  
Karin Wehlin 
For Karin Wehlin, her previous professional experience in the pharmaceutical industry 
had not been decisive in this case, even though her experiences in building companies 
were definitely useful, as they could be applied in any industry. The grain industry was 
a totally new market for her and specific knowledge on the field was limited, as it was 
also hard to recruit people in Sweden with a grain background and global experience in 
the business.    
When asked about the role of gut-feeling, she admitted that it affected her, and it was 
more evident in her beginning in the company, even if she acknowledged that it could 
lead her to a wrong path. The fact that the company employs a wide variety of 
professionals with different competencies, from a biochemist and a software developer, 
to a mechanical engineer, most of them without significant experience in the grain 
industry, made it essential for her to utilize elements of gut-feeling in the decision 
formulation process.  
  
Carl Magnus Cronholm 
According to Cronholm, intuition played a major role in the strategic decision making 
process that brought to the merger of the two companies that formed FEW. Talking 
about the merger Cronholm explained that: “I would say first, that, this kind of big 
decisions are not just rational, are also very emotional. It's easy to forget that. For 
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example the merger, which has been the springboard for us to grow in the last 2 couple 
of years.” In this kind of process the level of uncertainty was high, therefore according 
to Cronholm the decision was based more on an intuitive perception.  
He claimed that this was the first time he was confronting himself with the decision of 
merging two companies: “From my perspective, I had never made that kind of decision 
before, I mean I bought companies, but I never merged companies, for me and everyone 
else in this process it's been a little bit of try.” The human element was also crucial in 
the strategic decision making process, as it resulted to be more relevant than the 
numbers that could support this decision as financially valuable: “Since our kind of 
business is so deep rooted in human relations, the questions were: would I enjoy to go 
working with this people every day? For the rest of my life? Do I believe that you can 
go out here and sell a new communicative product to a client, etc.? So those kind of 
decisions on the people side, were more relevant than the numbers.” 
Cronholm at the same time believes that strategic decision making processes are not 
based only on intuition: “It's not intuitive all the time. But I would say that it's a big 
part of it. Because this kind of decisions, in our industry are really based on believing 
in the people you are supposed to work from that point on.” 
Professional experience is also part of this process, according to Cronholm, but it is not 
crucial for the eventual successful outcome of the strategic decision: “Yeah it's there 
and it's important, but if it doesn't check out, maybe you can do the deal anyway because 
you think you can work with this person.” Cronholm explained that professional 
development can probably help you to recognize and trust the right people. But at the 
same time, even though he has read a lot about business, and is always trying to gain 
knowledge from managers more experienced than him, by sharing information and 
being part of professional networks, he argued that: “The main point from all these 
discussions is that to be able to perform well in this world as a CEO, and make these 
kinds of decisions you need to rely on your gut-feeling. Because you cannot always be 
sure. There are no sure things. So you need to go with your intuition.” 
Cronholm claimed that this intuition or gut-feeling approach does not differ in bigger 
companies, such as Volvo or IKEA. On this point Cronholm stated: “I think it's the 
same thing, at the end of the day someone will deliver you an excel sheet saying, I think 
this is a good decision to buy this or downsize that, etc. But do you believe in it? [...] 
You know you can't just rely on facts, you also need to listen to yourself and your 
experience, and that's where the gut feeling comes in.” 
  
Fritiof Johansson      
Fritiof Johansson treated his professional experience in the decision process of the 
major acquisition as a type of filter, which enabled him to recognise various pitfalls, 
risks and exposures. It made him feel more comfortable with disregarding some parts 
of the information or the related risk, because he knew the kind of materiality an issue 
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could have. Thus, he could save time on irrelevant or immaterial topics and focus more 
on what was important.  
In the case of changing the focus of the organization, Johansson argued that feelings 
and beliefs played a part in the decision process, since, as he explained: 
“When it comes to setting up an organization, I would say, there you can use 
quantitative information to some level. But there I think it has to do more with 
conviction about the merits, than in some other types of decisions. Of course you have 
to be convinced when you start a big size, big scale R&D project. Of course you have 
to be convinced that the idea actually works, but I think there are so many aspects of 
reorganizing a company like ours that there are elements of convictions. Quantitative 
data plays a role, but there is a limit, you must be convinced.” 
  
Sam Aston 
According to Sam Aston, the management culture in the company is more oriented on 
intuitive processes: “We would go on a hunch, when we make our decisions, I would 
say. This is what we like, this is what we feel it's interesting from our perspective. We 
also listen to our employees of course, they are the skilled technological persons, so 
hopefully they will give us the right means and the right direction also.”  
He explained that professional experience played a big role in the strategic decision 
making process that led to the development of a new successful service for the clients. 
Aston described professional experience as an advantage, in respect to the other 
competitors: “So I would say that is something where we have a great advantage in. 
And we're not alone in that area of course. We have other competitors, they are quite 
good also and skilled, and know the market and know the trends, and we do so also.” 
Regarding the influence of personal judgement in deliberating about this strategic 
decision, Aston had no doubts in stating that they had a big role in it: “I'm a personal 
guy, so of course my personal judgements are in place and in the game absolutely. So 
I would say that they are definitely affecting me, and the decisions also.” 
He mentioned that his gut-feeling played a crucial role in any decision he had to make: 
“I know in what I'm pretty good at and I also, hopefully, know in what I'm not so good 
at. But I do most of my decisions on my gut-feeling and not on facts. I don't need to have 
figures, to make a decision. [...] I'm an extrovert person, so I need information from a 
lot of people, but I make a decision on my own. And I make it on what I feel is the right 
thing.” Aston stated that this depends on different management styles, but also on the 
personality of the leader. On this point, he added: “I would say there are a lot of 
different leaders and styles, some leaders are actually fact based, so if you say 49 % 
this and 51 % that, those leaders will go for the 51%. I wouldn't do that. Even if it's 
98% and 2 %, if I feel that those 2% is more right, I'll do that. I'm not a majority thinking 
person and fact thinking person, even though I am an engineer, so I like mathematical 
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reasoning, and logical reasoning around things, but I will still end up with what I feel 
in my guts. It's the most correct way to do.”  
According to Aston this also depends on the level of experience that people have in a 
certain area: “I have quite a lot of experience in some area, and in others I don't know 
too much. Then I have to rely on other people that are more skilled and experienced in 
that area.”  
Aston described another example of a strategic decision based on gut feeling that he 
made in the past. The strategic decision in which he participated on asking suggestions 
from the employees about how to improve the company’s brand image and go forward 
into the future, which proved to be extremely profitable for the organization, was mostly 
based on a hunch of the management group. As he specifically described: 
“I would say it was more of a feeling, I mean we were a consultancy firm, we totally 
relied on the persons actually working for the company, are enjoying the company, and 
want to be part of the company. So I don't think we actually read too much about 
statistics there, we had a hunch on we need to have them involved and driven and 
engaged in this matter. If they are that, they will probably stay a couple more years, 
and that's gonna be beneficial for us. It picked up quite good for us, it was easier for us 
to recruit and employ people.” 
  
4.5 Characteristics of the Companies 
  
Christer Wahlquist - Nolato 
According to Wahlquist, Nolato is a very decentralized company, employing almost 
6500 individuals, owning sites in Europe, Asia and North America. Nolato has 
nevertheless a very flat organization, with very few layers. The company is performing 
well and it is growing on a long term scale. Considering the external environment, 
Nolato is differentiated is three main business areas: medical solutions, industrial 
solutions and integrated solutions. Each of these areas have different markets and 
competitiveness. The more stable is the medical area. The integrated solutions is the 
more fast moving business, as well as the most unstable with the most volatile external 
environment. The industrial solutions, according to the CEO, is somewhere between 
the other two areas. 
  
Karin Wehlin - BoMill 
In the case of BoMill, the organizational structure is considerably flat, being an early 
startup in the agriculture machinery industry, comprising of 14 employees.  
Regarding BoMill’s financial performance, the company is increasing its presence in 
the market, but is still not in a position to make profit. Karin Wehlin claimed “We're 
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not a profit making company, not yet! We're still in the area of early commercial 
phase”, but she was confident about the potentials of the firm, since she stated “I know 
that the biggest companies in this area know exactly what we’re doing, and they 
approach us, then I know that the word is out there”. 
The external environment for BoMill is considered stable, since she argued: “[...] grain 
business I would say, is the world's second largest commodity, oil is the largest 
commodity and grain is the second largest, there is a huge market out there”, 
considering “production volumes, exports, imports”.      
  
Carl Magnus Cronholm - FEW 
  
FEW is also a quite flat organization and it counts 66 people employed. The company 
is not yet profitable, because there have been many investments in order to grow the 
business. Concerning the external environment, the communication industry as a whole 
has rapidly changed in the last decade. According to the CEO, this makes the external 
environment very volatile and subjected to the changes in the technology.  
  
Fritiof Johansson - BetaValue 
According to Fritiof Johansson, the organizational structure in BetaValue is relatively 
flat, employing a total number of 16500 employees, in Full Time Equivalent terms, 
operating in a matrix, with 3 main divisions, and also 8 clusters or sub-regions, based 
on a geographical dimension.  
As far as the company’s performance is concerned, Johansson stated that BetaValue, 
being part of the engineering companies universe, is currently performing at a 15-16 % 
operating margin level, which is considered to be top tier performance. He claimed the 
company has experienced even higher performance in the past, but a downfall in two 
of their main end-user industries, marine, and oil and gas, has affected their 
profitability.  
Fritiof Johansson argued that the external environment for BetaValue can be considered 
as stable, since the company is in a position to minimize risks by conducting business 
in a number of different industries and in a variety of markets worldwide. He explained 
that: 
“[...] we have stability in general, the way we're exposed to different end-user 
industries, different applications, by the mere width of the different applications as our 
products and solutions are used in, we supply to the food industry, various types of food 
applications, to construction, general manufacturing industry, and then of course oil 
and gas, refinery, petrochemicals, we have the marine industry, so a wide variety of 
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different industries, and that of course provides some hedging on variations in different 
industrial areas.” 
  
Sam Aston - Additude 
According to Aston, Additude is organized in a very flat way, providing employment 
for almost 100 people. The company is performing well and it has been growing since 
its foundation in 2009. The external environment is considered to be stable, 
characterized by an increasing number of competitors and customers, that lay the 
foundations for a growing market. The company is focusing on different sectors such 
as telecommunications, IT, Internet of Things and embedded solutions. 
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5. Discussion 
  
5.1 Managers’ Intuition 
 
As described before, the purpose of this study is to examine the role of intuition in a 
managerial strategic decision making context. Intuition is perceived as a decision 
making mechanism that depends on rapid, non-conscious recognition of patterns and 
associations to generate affectively charged judgments (Dane & Pratt, 2007). It is linked 
to having a hunch or a strong feeling of knowing what will happen (Vaughan, 1989). 
Khatri and Ng (2000) related intuition with a reliance on judgement, a reliance on 
experience, and utilizing gut-feeling. Based on the interviews conducted in the context 
of this research, the five executives were divided into three groups, in order to facilitate 
the reader to follow the comparisons between them. One group comprises of Karin 
Wehlin and Fritiof Johansson, another group is formed from Carl Magnus Cronholm 
and Sam Aston, and the final group includes Christer Wahlquist. 
Beginning from Carl Magnus Cronholm, he claimed that intuition played a significant 
role in his strategic decision making process. The ambiguity of the conditions he 
experienced in the process, led him to a more intuitive approach, putting emphasis on 
the people who were collaborating with him. He described: “It's not intuitive all the 
time. But I would say that it's a big part of it. Because this kind of decisions, in our 
industry are really based on believing in the people you are supposed to work from that 
point on.” Furthermore, he highlighted the importance of gut-feeling, stating that:  “The 
main point from all these discussions is that to be able to perform well in this world as 
a CEO, and make these kinds of decisions you need to rely on your gut-feeling. Because 
you cannot always be sure. There are no sure things. So you need to go with your 
intuition.” On the same note is Sam Aston, who, while discussing about the 
management group’s point of view on decision making, said: “We would go on a hunch, 
when we make our decisions, I would say. This is what we like, this is what we feel it's 
interesting from our perspective.” He also stressed the importance of professional 
experience, describing it as a valuable asset. Talking about his personality and how it 
relates to the decision making process, he explained: “I'm a personal guy, so of course 
my personal judgements are in place and in the game absolutely. So I would say that 
they are definitely affecting me, and the decisions also.” He was straightforward about 
the extreme importance of gut-feeling in his managerial processes, claiming in various 
parts of the interview that: “I do most of my decisions on my gut-feeling and not on 
facts. I don't need to have figures, to make a decision”, “[...] I like mathematical 
reasoning, and logical reasoning around things, but I will still end up with what I feel 
in my guts. It's the most correct way to do”, and generally basing his rationale on 
hunches and personal perceptions, rather than reports or statistics.  
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The decisions that both managers made were of utmost importance for their 
organizations, a condition that contradicts with the argument of Elbanna and Child 
(2007), that executives are expected to employ rational methods for the most important 
decisions, instead of the intuitive inclination that is recognised in this case. Cronholm 
and Aston both perceived the uncertainty related to their decisions to be considerably 
high, verifying the notions of Elbanna and Child (2007), and Daft and Lengel (1986) 
about a positive relation between high decision uncertainty and intuitive processes. 
Moreover, both managers considered their decisions to be opportunity driven, 
confirming the ideas of Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976), that decision 
makers avoid rational processes when dealing with opportunities.  
Taking into account the company characteristics, and specifically the company size, 
both CEOs are administrating mid-sized companies, so they can only partially relate to 
the theories of Khatri and Ng (2000), that small firms are more based on intuition than 
larger ones. Aston’s organization is performing well and continuously growing, which 
contradicts with the statement of Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988), that high-
performance is linked to more rational processes. In Cronholm’s case, the organization 
is not profitable yet, but it would be unsafe to relate that fact to the intuitive approach 
of the CEO. Furthermore, Cronholm considered the external environment to be highly 
volatile and unstable, which can be related to Fredrickson’s (1983) claims on intuitive 
processes to be favourable in such an environment. On the other hand, Aston’s view on 
a relative stable environment for his firm cannot support the above theory.  
Moving now to Karin Wehlin and Fritiof Johansson, a difference on the extent in the 
employment of intuitive processes can be noticed, compared to the previous group. 
Wehlin’s reliance on her professional experience was limited, due to the fact that she 
had worked in a completely different industry, although her experience in building 
companies has been undoubtedly useful. As regards the effect of gut-feeling in her 
decisions, she admitted that it played a role in the beginning, especially because of the 
limited experience on the grain industry inside the organization, even though her 
perception was that it might lead her to a wrong path. For Johansson, his professional 
experience enabled him to recognise possible pitfalls and focus on the most important 
aspects of the decision. It is noteworthy that, when asked about the role of gut-feeling 
in his strategic decision making process, he answered about the importance of facts and 
figures in building a solid reasoning, downplaying the intuitive methods. When 
discussing about the balance between rational and intuitive techniques, he focused on 
the role of conviction, stating: “Quantitative data plays a role, but there is a limit, you 
must be convinced.”  
The strategic decisions made by the two managers were highly important for their 
organizations, verifying the arguments of Hickson et al. (1986), that executives are 
more likely to use rational instead on intuitive processes when making crucial decisions 
for achieving the goals of the organization. The decision uncertainty for Wehlin had 
been considerably high, being opposed to the theories of Elbanna and Child (2007), and 
Daft and Lengel (1986), about a positive relation between high decision uncertainty and 
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more intuitive processes. The limited uncertainty in Johansson’s case, as described 
before, is more aligned to the aforementioned arguments, taking into account his 
restricted use of intuitive methods. For both executives, their decisions have been 
opportunity driven, contradicting with the ideas of Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret 
(1976).  
A significant difference becomes clear when examining the size of their organizations 
respectively. Johansson is a part of an immense organization, counting almost 16500 
employees worldwide, whereas Wehlin is the CEO of a startup comprising of 14 
employees. The findings related to Johansson support the statements from Snyman and 
Drew (2003), that larger firms employ a more rational approach, than an intuitive one. 
The claim from Elbanna and Child (2007), that in small firms the formulation of 
strategy depends on the idiosyncratic capabilities of a single person, finds application 
on the defining role of Wehlin in the formulation of her company’s strategies, but 
Brouthers, Andriessen and Nicolaes’ (1998) notion that managers in small firms tend 
to rely on their intuition and disregard collected information, opposes to Wehlin’s 
rational tendencies. Johansson characterized the performance of his organization as top 
tier, connecting to the views of Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988), that high-performing 
companies employ more rational decision making processes, instead of intuitive 
methods, while Wehlin argued that her company is increasing its market presence, but 
is still not making profits. Both executives conceive the external environment of their 
organizations as stable, verifying the claims of Fredrickson (1983) that in a stable 
environment rationality is favourable, rather than intuition. 
Analyzing the final group, Christer Wahlquist highlighted the importance of 
professional experience inside the organization, when discussing about strategic 
decisions. He explained that by receiving a lot of input from the customers and the 
market, he develops a sense on how to react in each occasion. This judgement clearly 
influences his strategic decision making process, as he stated that: “I would rather trust 
my judgement than the analytical tools.” According to his personal experience, the 
success of a company is mainly based on people and commitment, elements that are 
very difficult to fit into an analytical model. Wahlquist indicated being in touch with 
the environment as crucial, explaining that: “I much more believe being in the 
environment, in the market, talking to the customers, to competitors, to get your own 
influence. And then you collect that and make a decision based on your own judgement 
of the situation.”   
Since no clear answers were given in the interview regarding the decision specific 
characteristics, the company characteristics are followingly examined. Walquist is the 
CEO of a major organization, with 6500 employees and operations worldwide, so his 
reliance on personal judgements cannot fully verify the ideas of Snyman and Drew 
(2003), that larger firms utilize more formal and rational approaches. Wahlquist stated 
that his organization is performing well and growing on a long term scale, so again 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois’ (1988) claims that high-performing companies employ more 
rational decision making processes cannot be considered as totally applicable in this 
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case. Analysing the external environment, Wahlquist stated that the company is divided 
into three business areas, medical solutions, industrial solutions and integrated 
solutions, with each one operating in a different environment. Specifically, the medical 
solutions division is operating in a stable environment, the integrated solution in a more 
volatile and unstable environment, whereas the integrated solutions could be placed in 
a position in between the previous two. The decisions discussed during the interview 
were related to the medical solutions department, which, as mentioned, is operating in 
a stable environment. On that sense, Wahlquist approach to strategic decision making 
cannot be directly connected to Fredrickson (1983), that in a stable environment mainly 
rational processes are favourable.  
  
5.2 Managers’ Rationality 
 
Rationality relates to an analytic, systematic, rule-based, and explicit mechanism for 
decision making (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). The following discussion examines the 
role of rationality from the perspective of the five top executives that were interviewed. 
The managers are compared in the same groups as previously mentioned.  
Starting from Karin Wehlin, the grain industry had been an unfamiliar market in the 
beginning, so she focused on collecting and analysing data on the market and examining 
other advanced machinery in the industry. The fact that she was dealing with an 
innovative product created some ambiguity and uncertainty in her first steps, which 
forced her to follow her gut-feeling in the beginning, but then, as more information 
became available, she moved to rational techniques. As she graphically narrated: “The 
more facts you can put on the table to enable a sort of a sound decision, the better.” 
Similarly, Fritiof Johansson appeared to base most of his reasoning on thorough and 
careful analysis of the situation at hand. In both decisions he referred to, the major 
acquisition and the internal restructuring, his decision making was supported from 
comprehensive processes and analytical techniques. The following selection of quotes 
from the interview can clearly illustrate his overall approach: “[...] you have to be cold 
when it comes to the numbers”, “[...] numbers are good because they are not lying”, 
“[...] you have to contain the emotions”.   
For both managers, the decision discussed were extremely important and crucial for 
their organizations, supporting the notion mentioned by Elbanna and Child (2007), that 
executives are prone to using rational processes for the most important decisions. 
Regarding the uncertainty of the decision, a difference can be identified between the 
two executives, since in Wehlin’s case, the uncertainty was considerably high, because 
she was dealing with a disruptive technology and an innovative product. This fact can 
be connected to the suggestions of Daft and Lengel (1986), stating that high uncertainty 
results to more intuitive processes, as it was evident from Wehlin’s course to increasing 
rational practices as the uncertainty was diminishing through time. On the other hand, 
for Johansson the decision uncertainty was very limited, as three factors that he 
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mentioned, a Norwegian company to be acquired with a similar culture to his 
organization, an end-user industry and a technology very familiar to them, created a 
sound base for making the decision. Both managers admitted that their decisions were 
motivated by an opportunity or an urge to fulfil a company goal, which appears 
contradictory to the idea expressed by Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) that 
decision makers respond to opportunities without using rational and analytical 
methods.  
Examining the company characteristics, Wehlin’s small organization contradicts with 
the arguments of Brouthers, Andriessen and Nicolaes (1998), that in small companies 
managers rely more on intuition, considering Wehlin’s rational approach. On the other 
hand, Johansson’s rationality confirms the statements from Snyman and Drew (2003), 
that larger firms employ more rational methods. Johansson described the performance 
of his organization as top tier, verifying the notion of Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988), 
that high-performing companies employ more rational decision making processes, 
while Wehlin argued that her company is increasing its market presence, but is still not 
making profits. Both managers perceive the external environment of their organizations 
as stable, connecting to the claims of Fredrickson (1983) that in a stable environment 
rationality is favourable.   
Moving now to the second group and Carl Magnus Cronholm, he appeared to utilize 
analytical tools and rational arguments in order to support his original feeling, to a 
limited extent though. Likewise, Sam Aston claimed that he used studies, reports and 
market analysis during the strategic decision making process. For both of the managers, 
the decisions they were involved in were considered extremely crucial for the future of 
their organizations. In this case, the limited use of rational methods contradicts with the 
previously mentioned positive relation between rationality and high level of decision 
importance. A high level of uncertainty was identified in the decisions both executives 
made. Aston claimed that uncertainty is a key feature in every strategic decision, 
claiming: “[...] it's not as easy as black or white, and you don't see that, because then 
it would be quite easy to make strategic decisions.” The managers’ view on rationality 
in this occasion supports the ideas of Elbanna and Child (2007), and Daft and Lengel 
(1986) about a negative relation between rationality and high decision uncertainty. The 
decision motive was for both of them an opportunity they identified, to grow their 
businesses and become more profitable, which in this case relates to the aforementioned 
idea about limited use of rational techniques in opportunity-driven conditions.   
Examining the company characteristics, FEW and Additude are both mid-sized 
companies, employing 66 and 100 persons respectively. In this occasion, the findings 
only partially support the notion of Brouthers, Andriessen and Nicolaes (1998), that in 
small firms managers tend to disregard analytical techniques. Cronholm’s organization 
is not profitable yet, whereas Aston’s is performing well and growing. The argument 
of Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) about a positive relation between high performing 
firms and rationality is not supported from these examples. Cronholm considered the 
external environment for his company to be volatile and changing rapidly, which is 
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connected to Fredrickson’s (1983) concept of overlooking rationality in an unstable 
environment. On the other hand, Aston’s perception of a stable environment for his 
organization is opposed to this notion.   
The last executive to be examined is Christer Wahlquist. He discussed about the 
importance of human resources when collecting information inside the organization. 
Wahlquist claimed that he is an avid supporter of internal resources, when it comes to 
looking for and analyzing information, as a way to invest in the total knowledge inside 
the company and its human capital. Moreover, he mentioned utilizing a variety of 
analytical tools while deliberating for a strategic decision, for instance risk analysis, 
scenario analysis, budgeting, market research or external counseling.   
Due to the fact that no clear answers were given in the interview regarding the decision 
specific characteristics, the company characteristics are followingly examined. 
Wahlquist is part of a very large organization, with 6500 employees and operations in 
Europe, Asia and North America. Based on the previous analysis on the intuitive 
processes of Wahlquist, the arguments of  Snyman and Drew (2003) that larger 
companies tend to use a more rational approach in the strategic decision making process 
cannot be fully applicable. The company is high performing and growing on a long 
term scale, but the correlation of rational and intuitive methods in this case cannot relate 
it to the views of Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988), that high performing firms employ 
mainly rational processes. For the decision discussed, Wahlquist considered the 
external environment to be stable, though the employment of both rational and intuitive 
processes cannot be connected to Fredrickson’s (1983) views, that in a stable 
environment rational processes are favourable.  
  
5.3 Managers’ Political Behaviour 
 
A major finding from the executives that participated in the research is that political 
behaviours have a very limited effect, or in most cases do not affect at all the strategic 
decision making process. According to Elbanna (2006), in this process decisions are 
the outcome of a process where decision makers have contrasting interest, and the 
opinion of the most powerful prevails on the others (Elbanna, 2006). Based on our 
findings the executives interviewed do not show such behaviour as a crucial element 
that can affect the outcome of a decision.  
Based on our analysis there are two main characteristics that all the executives 
participating in this research share between them. The two main elements are: the 
alignment to the company’s goals and the culture of openness in the organization. 
Regarding the alignment to the company’s goals over the personal aspirations, all five 
executives interviewed agreed that when making their decisions, even if there were 
personal goals, these have never affected the strategic decisions they were involved 
with.  
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The second characteristic element is the fact that all five executives agreed about the 
importance of having a culture of openness between the members of the organization 
as a way to overcome possible political behaviours. This allows the sharing of 
information and therefore a better quality of the final decision. According to Elbanna 
(2006), one of the downsides of the political behaviour is the deterioration of the 
information flow which ends up in the low quality of the decision making 
process.  Therefore, openness is a crucial element for a company who wants to raise the 
quality of the strategic decision making process.  
An important political behaviour element that according to Elbanna (2006) is 
characteristic of this approach is the negotiation between the members of the 
management group. Wahlquist and Johansson, on this point, highlighted the importance 
of discussion over negotiations. According to the two executives the final strategic 
decisions analysed during the research evolved as the result of a discussion rather than 
negotiations between the members.  
Studies conducted by different authors such as Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret 
(1976) investigate politics affecting decision making processes as influenced by either 
internal and external factors. The present research highlighted how internal factors such 
as the management culture have a big impact on the political approach. Wahlquist states 
that he rarely overrules people because, first of all, the company’s culture is mainly 
consensus driven, and this is also connected to his management style. Wehlin identified 
that there is a kind of management style that is common to most Swedish organizations, 
it facilitates open discussion and limits the use of power when making decisions. 
Cronholm is aware that these political dynamics happening in the organization are part 
of the strategic decision making process. The way to overcome them is therefore, to 
always consider their presence and to stay focused on the main goal of the organization. 
According to Elbanna (2006) political behaviour can be related to the external factors 
such as a specific environment in which the organization operates. As we conducted 
our research in a relatively small area in Sweden, the external environment may have 
an effect on the politics factor that influenced the strategic decision making. However, 
we do not have enough data to analyse the environmental factors in an extensive way, 
due to the limits of our research. 
  
5.4 Conditions Which Favour Intuition in Managerial 
Strategic Decision Making 
  
Based on the analysis and discussion of the interviews conducted with the five top 
executives, the following table presents the extent to which our findings on intuition 
support the literature that was covered in Chapter 2.  
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Table 2 - Literature and Findings Correlation on Intuition 
  Wahlquist Wehlin Cronholm Johansson Aston 
Decision  
Characteristics 
          
Decision  
importance 
- Supported Not 
supported 
Supported Not 
supported 
Decision 
uncertainty 
- Not 
supported 
Supported Supported Supported 
Decision 
motive 
- Not 
supported 
Supported Not 
supported 
Supported 
Company  
Characteristics 
          
Company 
size 
Partially 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Partially 
supported 
Supported Partially 
supported 
Firm 
performance 
Partially 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Supported Not 
supported 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
Partially 
supported 
Supported Supported Supported Not 
supported 
  
It is evident from the table that the factors which displayed the highest correlation with 
the supporting literature are decision uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. In the 
case of decision uncertainty, three out of four managers supported the theories of 
Elbanna and Child (2007), that decision uncertainty cannot be dealt with rational 
processes, and Daft and Lengel (1986), stating that high decision uncertainty results to 
more intuitive procedures. Regarding environmental uncertainty, out of the five 
managers, three supported, and one partially supported the notion of Fredrickson 
(1983), who claims that in a stable environment, synoptic processes, like rationality, 
are favourable, whereas in an unstable environment, incremental processes, like 
intuition, should be used. Consequently, the conditions under which intuition was found 
to be favoured among executives are high decision uncertainty and an unstable 
environment.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Intuition in strategic decision making is a powerful tool in the hands of top executives. 
It is connected to the professional experiences of the managers, their personal 
judgements, and can be experienced as a strong feeling of knowing what will happen. 
Like a sixth sense, it enables the manager to identify the solution in various situations. 
As Khatri and Ng (2000) claim, individuals have countless experiences stored in the 
subconscious, and it is because of intuition that they can draw and choose among the 
alternatives the one that is more suitable. Though it has been relatively understudied 
until recently, the academic world has started to increase its awareness on the 
importance of intuition in strategic decision making (Elbanna, 2006).  
The present research examined the role of intuition in the contemporary managerial 
context, viewing it as a structural element of the strategic decision process. The 
realization after completing this study is that intuition has a prominent role in the 
managerial strategic decision making. It was present in all the executives who were 
interviewed, regardless of their position in the rationality-intuition spectrum. The study 
indicates that in multiple situations, for instance when information was scarce, the 
environment was volatile, the situation was highly complex, or an immediate decision 
was of the essence, managers employed intuitive processes when making crucial 
decisions that affected the future of their organization.  
Based on the qualitative data that were collected, it was proven that managers favoured 
intuition in strategic decision making in cases of high decision uncertainty and unstable 
environments, verifying already existing theories on the field. On the other hand, there 
was a discrepancy between other theories and the data collected. Contrasting findings 
are in regard of factors such as the importance and the motive of the decision, as well 
as the size and the performance of the companies run by the executives interviewed. 
These factors did not prove to affect their intuition in the strategic decision making 
process.  
In various occasions, intuition was intertwined with rationality, supporting the notion 
of Calabretta, Gemser and Wijnberg (2017), that these two concepts need to be 
addressed as a whole, putting the focus on the tension between them, rather than putting 
emphasis only on one of the two elements.  
The task of management, as Drucker argued, is to “make what is desirable first possible 
and then actual” (1954, p. 245). Intuition is an invaluable asset in the hands of 
executives, enabling them to deal with the ambiguity and complexity of the business 
world, in a perpetual struggle against time and resources, aspiring to make those 
decisions that will lead to the optimum result for the organization, without being in a 
position to safely know the outcome in advance. As Albert Einstein stated: “I believe 
in intuitions and inspirations … I sometimes feel that I am right. I do not know that I 
am.” 
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 6.1 Contribution 
 
According to several authors the problem regarding the role of intuition in the strategic 
decision making process is that there is still a lack of empirical data and consistent 
method in the research (Papadakis, Thanos and Barwise, 2010; Elbanna, Child & 
Dayan, 2013). With our study we attempted to contribute to this field, even from a small 
scale perspective, by collecting empirical material and, therefore, by further exploring 
this concept. The conditions under which intuition prevails in the strategic decision 
making process of executives were examined, and two of them were verified, in line 
with already existing literature on the field.  
 
6.2 Study’s Limitations 
 
When interpreting the data collected by the present research some limitations may be 
kept in mind. Potential limitations concern first of all the methodological approach 
utilized in this study. During our research we conducted interviews with executives on 
specific strategic decisions they have made in the past. Therefore a first limitation is 
the fact that we collected information about each strategic decision only from a single 
manager. That leads to another limitation concerning the personal bias of the executives 
interviewed. Elbanna and Child (2007) point out that the answers of the interviewees 
may be affected by the degree to which they agreed with the decision process and 
outcome. It is important to note that all the interviewees personally agreed with the 
decisions made to a very high extent, thus personal bias could play a role in the quality 
of the collected data. 
Another limitation concerns the scarcity of previous empirical research, therefore this 
limited the possibility to compare our findings with previous studies. Connected to this 
limitation is the geographical area analyzed in this research, which is limited to Swedish 
executives, running Swedish companies in the Skåne County of Sweden.  
 
6.3 Future Research 
 
Based on our limitations, future research should focus more on analyzing the same 
strategic decision by interviewing all the executives that participated in it. In this way 
it would be possible to compare the strategic decision from all the possible perspectives 
involved, and to explore on a deeper level the role that intuition plays in this process. 
Therefore, this would also allow the reduction of the risk of biases. 
Future research should also focus on the collection of empirical data in order to further 
examine the role of intuition in the executives when making a strategic decision. More 
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research in other cultural environments is required in order to compare the findings. 
More empirical data should be collected also in order to investigate the relation between 
the executives and their personal background focusing on factors such as education and 
cultural environment.  
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Appendix 
  
Interview questions 
Introduction 
1. What is your position in the company and what is your role? 
2. What is the organizational structure in your company? 
3. How is your company performing? 
4. Do you consider the external environment stable or unstable? 
5. Can you describe what could be a strategic decision for your company? 
6. What type of strategic decisions are you required to make? 
  
Successful Decision Making Case 
7. Can you describe a successful strategic decision you made in the past? 
8. Who were the people involved in the decision-making process? 
9. What is the level of importance for the decision made? 
10. What is the level of uncertainty for the decision made? 
11. Would you say that the decision was motivated by an opportunity or by a crisis? 
  
Rationality 
12. How thoroughly did the group search and analyze information in making this 
decision? 
13. Did you use analytic techniques in making the decision? If so, how important 
were they in the process? 
14. How efficient was the group at focusing its attention on crucial information, 
ignoring irrelevant information?  
  
Intuition 
15. Was your professional experience crucial while deliberating for the decision? 
16. Did your personal judgements influence you when making this decision? If so, 
to what extent? 
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17. Did your gut-feeling influence you when making this decision? If so, to what 
extent? 
  
Political behaviour 
18. Did group members primarily cared about their own goals, or with the goals of 
the organization? Did your own personal goals affected the decision? 
19. Were people open with each other about their concerns and preferences in the 
decision? 
20. To what extent was the decision affected by the use of authority and influence 
among group members?  
21. To what extent was the decision influenced by negotiation among group 
members? 
  
Personal Bias 
22. To which degree did you personally agree on the decision made? 
  
  
Unsuccessful Decision Making Case 
23. Can you make an example of a strategic decision that did not result in the desired 
outcome? 
24. Were the same people involved? 
25. Was the decision-making process similar? If not, what changed? 
 
